

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Lessons for Social Protection from the COVID-19 Lockdowns

REPORT 2 OF 2: NON-STATE ACTORS

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Lessons for Social Protection from the COVID-19 Lockdowns

Report 2 of 2: Non-State Actors

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Introduction

This report is part of a series that seeks to use COVID-19 and its attendant lockdowns in India as a crucial moment to assess social protection. We understand social protection as "all public and private initiatives that provide income or consumption transfers to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks and enhance the social status and rights of the marginalized; with the overall objective of reducing the economic and social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable and marginalized groups" (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004). Social protection thus includes measures that are *protective* against destitution— both amidst crisis as well as in the everyday— as well as *promotive* in how they enable individuals, households and communities to thrive and flourish rather than just survive.

Policy and scholarship both recognize that social protection plays an important role in alleviating poverty, improving standards of living, mitigating risks and shocks, and reducing episodes of financial adversities. In this series, we argue that relief work necessitated by COVID-19 and its attendant lockdowns is a diagnostic through which to understand, assess and re-imagine social protection in India. We ask three inter-related questions:

- First: what do the immediate relief measures put into place to cope with the impact of COVID-19 and the lockdowns tell us about the current state of social protection systems?
- Second: how did these measures effectively target and deliver relief in complex and constrained situations such as the lockdowns?
- Third: what lessons does this set of immediate relief measures offer not just for medium-term recovery but for designing, building and improving social protection systems?

We focus on these particular questions because while gaps in India's social protection systems are well known, the assessment of those gaps often focuses on missing entitlements rather than the challenges in delivering even existing entitlements effectively. Both, we argue, are crucial. To take one example: eight of ten workers in India work within the informal economy (ILO 2018). This implies a challenge to the entitlement framework since, by definition, many informal work arrangements are characterised precisely by the lack of access to social security benefits (ILO, 2013) (NCEUS, 2009). Yet it also presents a particular set of delivery challenges. The conditions of informal employment do not just create and shape the nature of need, but they also confound processes of delivery. Entitlements struggle to reach informal workers precisely because the nature of their work make them hard to reach if: (a) they are mobile across regions, (b) beyond regulatory frameworks, (c) outside accessible or appropriately scaled databases; (d) in workplaces and residences that are hard

to reach such as landfills, streets, construction sites and private homes; and (e) beyond the reach of usual delivery channels such as employers, fair price shops, *anganwadis* or through direct bank transfers.

To look at the delivery of entitlements within COVID-19 relief, we use three key analytical frames that structure the report. These are:

- Processes of Identification and Verification: how did relief measures identify, define and find whom to give relief to? Here we look closely at eligibility criteria to be part of a relief scheme, verification processes, as well as the use of databases to direct relief.
- Defining the Entitlement: on what basis was the form and quantum of particular entitlement decided for different categories of recipients? Here, we assess what was given as relief, and consider the factors that led to this determination.
- Designing Delivery mechanisms: how was a decided entitlement delivered to the right person at the right time? Here, we focus on the modes, processes, and actors responsible for ensuring the promised entitlement actually reached the right person within an appropriate time frame.

These three elements are key components not just of relief but of any social protection system. Relief measures both continued, used and expanded existing systems of design and delivery but also innovated with "temporary" measures that created new categories of recipients, new forms of entitlements, and new mechanisms of delivery. It is crucial that we learn from both the continuities as well as the innovations of the social protection measures implemented in this time in order to improve these systems in a post-COVID world.
In the first report of this series, we focused on state actors by which we meant any central or state undertakings including governments, departments, agencies, and/or parastatals acting in their public capacity. In this report, we look at what – for brevity and ease – we are calling Non-State Actors (NSAs, henceforth). NSAs are a broad category that encompasses several different types of organisations and individuals beyond the state. These include registered non-governmental organisations (NGOs), unregistered groups and associations, temporary or long-standing volunteer groups, private entities such as companies, as well as national and international aid organisations.

In 2020, the work of NSAs was noted by many for relief work during the lockdowns, particularly in reaching migrants. To cite just one example, in hearings in the Supreme Court on relief to migrant workers that had started walking on highways, the Court observed that NSAs deserve "all appreciation" for their efforts in relief.1 Beyond appreciation, we argue that the work of NSAs also forms a critical archive to learn about relief – its identification, form and delivery – and to draw broader lessons about social protection systems in a post-COVID world.

Our focus is on two particular entitlements: the delivery of different forms of food as relief and, in a more limited sense, cash transfers when given for access to food but also at times for travel, medical or housing support. We proceed as follows. The following section briefly describes the archive we draw on as well as our methods to access NSAs and document their relief work. We then take on each element of our framework – identification, definition of the entitlement, and design of the delivery – and look at how NSAs delivered food within relief work during COVID-19 and its attendant lockdowns. We conclude with implications and lessons that this relief work offers for social protection systems before, during, or post-crisis.

[1]See: https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2020/jun/09/ngos-deserves-all-appreciation-for-helping-migrants-during-covid-19-pandemic-supreme-court-2154304.html

the Archive

To assess relief by NSAs, we assessed the work of 42 actors that covered individuals, individuals in support with organisations, non-profit organisations, citizen collectives, labour unions, volunteer organisations, social impact organisations, housing rights advocacy groups, and citizen technology platforms. We did so across multiple geographies across India, covering organisations in six states with a focus on urban relief efforts. All the NSAs assessed were active in providing relief between March 16th, 2020 and June 16th, 2020, covering all four lockdowns in the first wave of COVID-19 in 2020 (see Table 1).

Table 1 Phases of the Lockdown

Phase	Start	End
Lockdown 1	25 March 2020	14 April 2020
Lockdown 2	15 April 2020	3 May 2020
Lockdown 3	4 May 2020	17 May 2020
Lockdown 4	18 May 2020	31 May 2020

Annexure 1 lists and details the organisations, classified by type and location. Figure 1, below, shows the range of their institutional types, the relief they offered, geographies where they worked and who they provided relief to. Focusing primarily on ease of access using purposive sampling, we tried to include relief measures at different scales (street, neighbourhoods, cities, states and highways); spatialities (urban, rural, riot affected areas, rehabilitation and resettlement sites, informal economic vulnerability) as well as across types of organisations (NGOs, unions, citizen settlements); communities (gender, caste, religion, disability, collectives/ volunteers/ individuals). From April to June, 2020, we conducted phone interviews with people who engaged in relief work individually or as representatives of an association or organisation. We also drew upon published reports, website materials, and media coverage on relief by non-state actors included in our database.

Figure 1 Relief by Non-State Actors



identifying beneficiaries

Like social protection systems themselves, all targeted relief relies on specific criteria for determining eligibility of individuals for any particular entitlement as well as the use of specific practices to be able to identify them. It is important then to understand the criteria employed to identify beneficiaries, the databases that were used and the way in which the database(s) were employed. In this section, we focus on the 'database' - a listing of people as per a pre-defined criterion— as well as the 'criteria' that became the basis on which one is included or excluded from particular forms of relief. How, in other words, did NSAs identify who should get relief? How did they find databases that had the right information to be able to reach beneficiaries?

In looking at state actors, we had argued that existing, large-scale public databases were available but they fell far short of the scale of vulnerability revealed by the lockdowns. State actors had to innovate by, for example, using databases designed for one purpose for another, layering entitlements in the process. In looking at NSAs, we find a different faultline, one that distinguishes between those actors that had existing databases to draw upon for relief and others that had to generate them. This emerges as a fundamental distinction among NSAs and the kind of relief work they were able to do. Below, we first describe this distinction by detailing how NSAs worked with and without existing databases. We then then look at criteria within both existing and new databases – on what basis were people included and excluded? Finally, we look processes of verification and prioritisation – how did one assess, verify, and test databases for accuracy and coverage?

1.1 Existing and New Databases

1.1.1 NSAs used existing databases as a criterion for identification

One set of NSAs had existing databases that they could immediately work with. The nature of such databases can largely be distinguished into two main types: the first is membership lists and the second is lists of beneficiaries from previous projects and interventions.

The first type is largely with what can be understood as Membership-Based Organisations (MBOs). These can take the form of unions, cooperatives, community-based organisations, or federations, where individuals are members associated with the NSA, whether linked to the payment of regular dues or not. For the MBOs in our sample, turning to relief during COVID-19 was inevitable since the criterion of membership was a form of work or identity associated with conditions of economic and social vulnerability. These MBOs were thus formed to collectively address such vulnerability and their engagement with the welfare and rights of their members long preceded COVID-19.

In the context of relief, the membership of such organisations represented valuable publics that could be reached quickly and effectively through an organisation that both represented and was accountable to them. For instance, a domestic workers' union in the state of Rajasthan had over 6,000 registered members at the start of the pandemic. Similarly, a union of self-employed working women (mostly street vendors and home-based workers) in Delhi had 3,000 members and access through them to their households. Such MBOs had long-established relationships of trust with beneficiaries and drew on a deep familiarity about their living and working conditions. This made them ideally placed, in many ways, to deliver relief.

For organisations without members, there were other forms of pre-existing databases. Many registered organisations who worked long term with poor and vulnerable groups through projects, their previous work became an accessible database for relief. For example, a registered organisation working with communities of transgender women in Bengaluru was able to identify those in need through an existing beneficiary list from a previous intervention as well as from a partner list. They were then able to distribute ration kits to 1300 individuals who were previously identified for a different project with the Karnataka State Aids Prevention Society (KSAPS). Additionally, they received a list of names from a partner organisation working with People Living with HIV (PLHIV) to whom they then distributed nutrition kits.

Similarly, a large registered organisation that works across multiple states in India on the issue of Right to Education (RTE) had names and numbers of parents of children who they had assisted in getting enrolled in schools under RTE. They used this large data set to reach out for COVID relief. The use of existing databases can also exist within shorter engagements within less formally constituted NSAs. For example, unregistered citizen collectives that had been formed during the Delhi communal violence of February 2020 were able to continue to use databases created for relief then for COVID-19 relief during the 2020 lockdowns.

NSAs with existing databases could react faster and at considerable scale. They were often the first to begin providing relief immediately as the lockdowns started, reaching a large number of beneficiaries in a short time period. For instance, one registered organisation was able to provide 68.8 lakh meals within just two months of the first lockdown. They also could use the existing database for deeper and specific forms of knowledge that could further nuance the kind of relief offered. Many ran quick surveys using their existing databases to get a better sense of needs and vulnerabilities. This allowed them to cater to various nutritional or economic needs that were better-suited to demographic and spatial needs. For example, one organisation was able to quickly run a comprehensive needs assessment among the communities they work with in Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh, revealing the need for sexual and reproductive health materials, access to health information and women's health products in addition to food or nutrition support.

1.1.2 NSAs without existing databases carried out rapid surveys

Organisations, associations, collectives and individuals that did not have access to pre-existing databases of their own had to generate them before relief work was possible. They did this in multiple ways. One set of NSAs were able to quickly mobilise their own staff along with on-ground volunteers and community-based activists to assess sites, conduct surveys and understand on-ground needs. They then used rapid surveys to generate new beneficiary databases. Our dataset shows that these rapid surveys were mainly conducted based on references from within communities, direct contact through helplines and, in some instances, on the basis of reaching out to known spatial sites of vulnerability i.e. covering a specific neighbourhood or area in the city.

For example, in one case, the NSA's contact number was provided in the public domain through which individuals in need could directly get in touch. A list was then created of all those who called in and a team conducted a rapid on-ground survey for more details. They were often aided by a large number of unregistered collectives that came together online, using WhatsApp, where individual citizens collated lists and passed them onto relief giving NSAs. Organisations with SOS helplines also set up partnerships with local unions and community-based organisations as well as with some sort of volunteer base that could promptly identify and verify beneficiaries. As one of the Bangalore-based NGOs that engaged in relief work told us: *'Once we were able to cater relief to families that we work with otherwise, we engaged with local unions and set up a helpline through which people could get in touch with us directly and place requests for relief material'.*

NSAs also opened up other ways for those in need to reach them using identification techniques that relied on need-based requests and calls on helplines. For example, a registered organisation whose presence is across rural and urban areas in multiple states in India extensively used their helpline numbers to identify more beneficiaries. The organisation's work is on providing information through IVRS (interactive Voice Response Systems) which are pre-recorded helplines on government policies for rural citizens as well as migrants living in urban centres. The IVRS has content on NREGA, labour rights, factory related news, domestic violence, early marriage, etc. The interactive technology deployed by the organisation also allows beneficiaries to record questions and leave messages.

During the lockdowns, the organisation turned this existing helpline infrastructure into a COVID-19 and lockdown information service. The founder of the organisation told us that *"cries for help immediately started coming on [their] helpline numbers [as] people were in acute distress and wanted to know the new rules on the lockdown and ways to get back to their homes."* When beneficiaries called in for support for food, health or travel, and relayed their location and needs, the organisation would connect them to local support groups. The organisation also shared its helpline numbers on a Bengaluru-based organisation's national dashboard of NSA's so that their COVID19 helpline can be publicized on platforms with a bigger reach.

Ultimately, the whole relief operation of this registered organisation encompassed 35 districts with 200 volunteers working on ground. The founder of the organisation recounts: *"we are seasoned users of IVRS and over the years we have built strong capacities of our staff on how best to provide services through our helplines. Since we are comfortable using technology we also assisted people in registering for E-coupons and travel passes. We did see this come into action during the lockdown as beneficiaries reported that they found our system more reliable. Further as we already had a robust structure in place we were able to take on the*

work of this humanitarian emergency. We also ventured out of our regular thematics and placed demands such as 'one nation one ration card' to government officials. We will continue to do this work that has emerged due to the pandemic as it has only shown us the existing inequalities that exist in our communities."

Another citizen group based in Gurugram, Haryana, also set up helpline numbers where beneficiaries could call and get information and support and citizen volunteers would make calls and carry out further simple surveys to add beneficiaries to their list. *"Volunteers,"* we were told, *"completed a small questionnaire where they asked beneficiaries their names, the number of people in need of assistance in their family/community, where they currently live."* This allowed this citizen group to understand the kind of support required, the number of beneficiaries and the location where relief had to be provided. They also maintained a database of all beneficiaries, highlighted local leaders that could act as delivery liaisons and for checking if the delivery had been received. In time, the state itself often reached out itself to send lists and databases: *"The District Collector also added us to their WhatsApp group so that we can inform them of the beneficiaries we have reached out".*

Other NSAs partnered with what could be understood as hyper-local community organisations for identification of people in need as well as for the delivery of entitlements. This was particularly the case when NSAs did not have any personal networks or presence in particular areas and thus reached out and built new partnerships with residents, youth groups, and even informal collectives in specific locations. Examples from across the country were found of such rapid partnership building, a facet of relief we will return to later. Where communities had strong associational life, in a way, it made the possibility of reaching out to NSAs easier. For example, a group of residents in a settlement in Delhi made their own list of beneficiaries in their community and reached out to larger registered organisations as well as government agencies to try and secure relief. The differential strength of hyper-local associational forms, in a way, also determined which communities were able to secure relief and, in some cases, even accumulate disproportionate access to it.

Many partnerships that allowed the creation of new databases for relief were enabled by timely connections and introductions. In our research, we repeatedly came across certain key individuals who were – often informally – driving the process of identifying those in need of assistance. We have called these actors "embedded individuals." These embedded individuals were able to act as nodes and bridges in state and non-state actor networks to leverage quicker access to their chosen communities. Many of these individuals were seasoned activists who were not affiliated with a single registered organisation. They leveraged their trust and credibility to enable the expansion of relief work at a time of crisis.

Sometimes, though not as often as one would imagine, this role was played by local leaders who helped in both making databases as well as verifying their accuracy. In Bengaluru, in one case, an NSA took help from police personnel as a way to identify new beneficiaries in need. While other NSAs did reach out to elected representatives, tellingly, these were a minority of cases. Some NSAs also received beneficiary names from the donor agencies, partner organisations, community members in consultation with the gram panchayat, state agencies like police personnel and staff in government hospitals.

In cases where the NSAs were also working in rural areas, a number of organisations ran initial surveys and facilitated farmers and other residents of the village to mobilise for food

grains and masks. One prominent form of relief that was required where identification was a particular challenge, however, was to know the whereabouts of their walking relatives. Here, NSAs innovated. Unable to access any databases of walking migrants, they directly went to highways where they stopped trucks and helped people who were walking by or simply set up food and shade facilities for the walking migrants.

In particular sites, the need for this relief was evident, for example in Seoni, Madhya Pradesh. The geographical location of the town near the border of Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh meant it was an ideal site where one could assist migrants who were walking from the many cities of Maharashtra such as Pune, Mumbai and Nasik towards Coimbatore in Tamil Nadu or Bengaluru in Karnataka. The founder of the organisation told us: "Our proximity to National Highway 44, also known as the North South corridor, let us reach these migrants quickly." The organisation had to constantly innovate ways of identifying and reaching beneficiaries. We cite this important example of working without a database at some length:

"We figured out truck drivers would only stop if they themselves were hungry. So we started waving down trucks, buses, cars, bikes we saw. There was no way for us to take names or numbers of the beneficiaries - we would just ask where they were coming from and where they were going, we gave out our numbers and said they should call us in case they needed more help or tell us when they reached their homes. Some called but many didn't. The sheer number of people we saw and supported was too much. For example, during the first lockdown, I saw maybe 15,000 - 20,000 people pass the highway in a five hour window. People were piled up in trucks in three tiers. Ultimately, we helped around 4 lakh people. In a day, we would serve 2500 kgs of puffed rice, 500 kilos of namkeen, 1000 kgs of pulao, 500 sacks of water pouches, 700-800 pairs of slippers for those walking, and sometimes we gave cash from our own pockets!"

Across both NSAs that had databases or needed to make new ones, two findings emerge strongly. First that NSAs are able to operate scalarly at aggregations far beyond a usual narrative of thinking of them as micro, located or niche actors. Even without state support – an argument we will return to later – NSAs accessed lakhs of beneficiaries across sector, spatial forms, locations and socio-cultural communities. Their ability to do so even when they had to generate new databases for immediate action is remarkable, and shows the possibilities in thinking of them as a delivery infrastructure at scale.

The second is that, like we argued for state actors (IIHS 2020), there is a direct relationship between the strength, form and organisational strength of NSAs before crisis and the scale of relief they are able to offer during and after it. Relief relies on capacity that precedes shock. Membership based organisations – collectives, unions, federations – are particularly effective institutional forms for the delivery of relief, underscoring again the importance of supporting collectivisation of workers as well as other vulnerable groups to enable collective action. We will return to this argument in the concluding section. Now, we move to thinking about what criteria were used within both these existing and new databases to identify who should receive relief.

1.2 On Criteria: Spatial, Social, Occupational and Negative Categories

Within existing or new databases, different criteria determined who was included or excluded. These criteria are critical to assess as they determine the reach of relief work and

questions of targeting, priority and focus. There were several different kinds of criteria that were used by NSAs to make their databases. These include:

1.2.1 Vulnerable Groups:

For NSAs interviewed in this study, vulnerability was a primary criteria of being eligible for relief. Vulnerability was most easily and widely proxied through group membership that indicated either occupational or social vulnerability, or a combination of the two. For example, NSAs already worked with (pre-COVID) or chose to focus on relief on (during COVID) female-headed household (FHH), children, households with no earning member, households with People with Disabilities (PWDs), widowed, daily wage workers, street vendors, homeless residents, domestic workers, ragpickers, migrant workers, sex workers, Adivasi families, etc. In most cases, then, being part of a group understood to be vulnerable was seen as both necessary and sufficient to be included within a database. Individual or household characteristics were not the basis of criteria, as was often the case with state relief which relied on ration cards, BPL cards, or income certificates.

1.2.2 Negative Categories:

Some NSAs, aware of multiple state relief programmes during COVID, positioned themselves as ideally placed to cover those left out of state relief. They thus used negative criteria for inclusion such as, for example, using rapid surveys to identify individuals or households that did not have state authorised identification such as Aadhar Cards, or proof of residence of any other kind, making them ineligible for much of state relief. Some NSAs within our sample suggested that those people with formal registration often received relief from other sources and hence directed their focus towards beneficiaries from the rapid surveys that fell under this 'negative category' of inclusion. This was particularly seen in the Bengaluru NSAs in our study. One interviewee stated: *"If they had ration cards or ID cards, they were not eligible. The reason being that those with ration cards had access to government-provided provisions and those with Karnataka voter IDs were often provided aid by politicians."*

1.2.3 Spatial Categories:

If membership in occupational or social categories were one way to ascertain vulnerability, another was by presence in particular spatial geographies. Two examples here detail different forms of spatial identification. Some NSAs targeted relief to known vulnerable neighbourhoods in the city such as informal settlements, resettlement colonies, urban villages or unauthorised colonies. Within these, they often worked with what we have called embedded individuals, or created partnerships with hyper-local community organisations, to generate beneficary lists. Here, living in a vulnerable neighbourhood was seen as sufficient to be included in the database and the neighbourhood acted as a spatial proxy of that vulnerability. Such spatial proxies often aligned with social and occupational categories, especially when NSAs worked with neighbourhoods marked by concentrations of a particular religious, caste, regional, or occupational demographics such as in waste picker colonies.

Spatial identification could also be more time-specific as in the case of some NSAs who chose to work in the Northeast district of the Delhi, an area that had just seen communal violence, using that as a primary inclusion criteria rather than social or economic vulnerability. Further, as detailed in Section 1.1 above, spatiality was also a criteria when accessing migrants who had begun to walk on highways to return home. For assisting these mobile beneficiaries, relief

desks were set up on the highways specifically targeting moving trucks and on-foot migrants, providing them with food, water, cash, slippers, clothes, and short rides further to their destinations.

1.2.4 Directed Categories:

At times, interviews revealed that the choice of beneficiary was influenced by donor agencies, members of political parties, unions and community members. Some donors also requested for certain kinds of relief to be provided and were also willing to sponsor particular individuals. A private educational institute based in Bengaluru, providing relief during this time, for instance, came across several such situations during its beneficiary identification process: *"Many people sponsored individuals. Some of them asked to sponsor a specific person they already knew or found were in difficult conditions....if they were eligible, the individual could sponsor that person. We constantly received recommendations and requests from influential people from posh communities to feed their domestic workers who did not always fit the eligibility criteria."*

Discrimination was also observed, in some instances, where people of a certain religious group were kept out of the provision of relief supplies in some areas, or, as in the case of local leaders in a site in Bengaluru who wanted relief only to be given to people who 'belonged to the state' and had Voter ID cards.

Several themes emerge in thinking about how NSAs identified beneficiaries for relief. In contrast to state relief, where questions of identification were linked to large databases of state recognised categories, beneficiaries of existing schemes and programmes, and those that held identification documents like ration cards or BPL cards, identification strategies for NSAs relied heavily on already existing occupational or social group categories. These categories are wider and more openly defined than categories used by state actors, and this certainly allows more flexibility in relief given NSAs. It also gives priority to assessing vulnerability at group level rather than the scale of the individual or household, under-emphasizing smaller variations between individual members of a group, and thereby being more mindful of errors of false exclusion rather than wrongful inclusion. Group vulnerability also allows recognition of multiple forms of intersecting vulnerability – identity, occupation and spatiality are autonomous but inter-connected, and each shapes vulnerability in different ways.

NSAs are not in the same position as the state to think of a public in more universal terms but instead take a view refracted through existing collective categories. This has many positive attributes: an ease of verification, a quick and effective proxy for specific kinds of vulnerability, the ability to target what may remain excluded in state relief through, for example, the use of negative categories (those without identity cards) or a focus on specific neighbourhoods or spatial locations (hard to reach areas, the peri-urban, specific neighbourhoods). It also, however, means that accessing relief from NSAs is more readily available to existing categories or that beneficiaries have a higher likelihood of being reached if they belong to certain categories than others. Like in state relief, this implies a differential ability to claim relief that could result in patchwork geographies of relief. We must then ask: which communities are better networked, already mobilised, or relatively more proximate to NSAs?

Further, if belonging to social or occupational group identities is a criteria for accessing relief from NSAs, then existing power differentials within and across these group identities also influences relief. It can do so both in ways that anticipate and challenge these power differentials (for example, actors that sought

to give relief only to those without state identification, others that targeted relief in neighbourhoods where they anticipated discrimination, or believed higher need existed due to impoverishment), but also in ways that reinforce them (respond to the most visible and organised groups, actively limit relief to certain groups, or actively discriminate against the provision of relief to certain groups). There is then greater flexibility but also, possibly, a greater degree of difficulty in ascertaining accountability.

As NSAs began to increasingly use spatial categories due to the ever-changing needs and conditions of providing relief, a possibility emerges of thinking more universally as opposed to via established occupational and social group identities. When using spatial proxies like vulnerable neighbourhoods or even particular mobilities like migrants on highways, NSAs were more universal in their coverage, albeit within specific spatial bounds, such as covering all residents within a neighbourhood, for example. The differences in using spatial versus social or occupational categories – or, ideally, a layered combination of the two – as the criteria for inclusion is something we will return to in the concluding recommendations once again.

1.3 Identification, Verification and Prioritization

For NSAs that were membership-based, verification, especially in the first phases of delivery, was not seen as a significant need, and often not undertaken at all. This was unlike what we saw in relief extended by state actors. Why was this the case? There are several reasons. For NSAs where membership was already defined on the basis of social or occupational vulnerability, membership acted as an automatic verification. The concern was how to reach as many as quickly as possible. However, even here, as the lockdowns progressed through the summer of 2020, this begun to change. First, as NSAs looked towards expanding relief outside of their existing database, verification became more pertinent in their relief process. Second, as lockdowns stretched and resource limitations became more severe, concerns of over-supplying some beneficiaries and under-supplying others as well of duplication emerged, and the need for prioritisation became stronger.

One reason for a verification step to be included was to ensure that only those really in need were the ones receiving relief. NSAs reported that their concern was more to not exclude beneficiaries, rather they worried about giving excess to others from limited resources. Another reason was to avoid duplication. With many NSAs working in often geographically shared areas, multiple lists existed with individuals and families on several, creating confusion and delays. This confusion persisted through the relief activities, sometimes causing duplication of entitlements received by certain individuals or even not receiving entitlements due to cancellation by organisations when they found out that another list existed, in the hope that the other organisation might take up the burden of providing relief. The verification processes evolved as time passed because individuals and organisations had a better understanding of the situation. For example, an individual who was able to collate funds and distribute relief in Bangalore said: *"At the beginning we were catering to all requests we got and did not verify. Gradually we realized that few people were asking for food relief even though they had received it from other sources. The supply of relief was obviously much lower than the demand, hence we started verifying to ensure we could fill the gaps where required."*
Among NSAs without pre-existing databases

within our sample, there were also a few organisations that did not carry out a verification process at all. For example, a restaurant based in Bengaluru providing ration kits to those in need did not consider verification as a necessary step in their relief work: *"there was no verification as such, even though there was an overlapping of relief at some places...didn't focus on verification of the beneficiaries, just helped out the people who directly approached."* While this was the case with a few organisations, most other NSAs without pre-existing databases in our sample recognised the need for a step that involved verification of beneficiaries.

For example, an NSA organisation in Bengaluru used surprise checks as a verification process. *"We came across several people who asked for more ration kits despite some other organisation or agency providing provisions to them. Surprise checks were conducted to check for this where individuals were told that one of the team members will come and visit in a couple of days but were visited the same night instead."* Due to limited availability of resources such as ration or health kits, if NSAs found that relief has been previously provided to an individual, they were considered ineligible for receiving more relief. This allowed NSAs to utilise their resources effectively and allocate provisions particularly to those in need: *"We ensure no overlap or hoarding since there is not enough material to cover actual requirement."*

Both types of NSAs – with or without existing databases – did start using state identification such as Aadhar cards, Voter IDs, BPL cards, as ways to track who had received relief. However, having these cards was rarely a pre-requisite and no NSA reported refusing relief if beneficiaries did not have state identification. This meant that verification was done on an 'as-much-as-possible' rule rather than being framed on the lines of an inclusion-exclusion criteria or an auditable requirement. Often, the rapid partnerships that we alluded to earlier became ways of verification as well as volunteers would do door-to-door assessments or run phone banks that checked names and numbers against addresses.

As resources became constrained, verification began to overlap with estimating differential vulnerability that could prioritize the distribution of relief. Steps began to get added to also identify EWS households, or those living in particular housing conditions, locations, or in particular communities that NSAs determined – almost instinctively by *'listening to the ground'* as one interviewee recalled –were being underserved. Different NSAs used different criteria to determine priority: economic status, social status (caste, religious groups), residence status (migrants), specific occupational categories (daily wage workers, sex workers), or even poor housing conditions (pavement dwellers, *kuccha* housing).

Sometimes vulnerability was within a single category. As one interviewee working with waste pickers in Bangalore shared: *"Of the 10,000 that we generally work with, we identified 1500 waste pickers we work with as the most vulnerable."* Similarly, another NSA that focused on providing support to children in care homes had a pre-existing list of care homes they work with but prioritised different beneficiaries at different phases of their relief effort. During the first phase of their relief efforts, they contacted care homes within their database and prioritised only those homes in need of immediate relief. Their second phase of relief work involved cash transfers. Here, the identification process was slightly more complex with multiple rounds of shortlisting. Those that met their criteria of needing support and being under-funded from their existing database were identified and specifically prioritised for receiving cash transfers. They were able to carry out this elaborate process within just a week and start the delivery

process. This also highlights that organisations quickly improved and adapted their verification and prioritization process to the situation at hand and the nature of relief that was to be provided.

Prioritization within NSAs – unlike with state actors – is harder to describe along clear, defined criteria, thresholds or rules as was the case of state relief, and these criteria also changed suddenly and rapidly in a rapidly evolving crisis situation. It varied by NSAs, across stages of lockdown, as well as depended on the resource availability with an NSA at any given point. Different criteria could be defined, with flexibility but then also a lack, at times, of transparency or consistency. Here again, a certain proximity to networks determined who could be accessed for prioritization and who couldn't though some NSAs deliberately sought to prioritise those they thought were left out or could be left out such as those without identification, those mobile in the city, those in peri-urban areas, those in areas marked by marginalised social identities. We will return to these dynamics in the final concluding section of the report.

defining Entitlements

The second part of our framework looks at how it is determined what to give as an entitlement within relief. We focus our analysis on food as an entitlement. To understand how to assess different forms of entitlements that can be given, we use the terms form and viability. By form of entitlement, we mean the type of relief that was given – for example, dry ration versus cooked meals. We use viability to understand what determined which form of entitlement was given, looking at the factors that led NSAs to choose one form of entitlement over another. We then look at a specific advantage that relief by NSAs had versus state relief, i.e. the ability to customise and contextualise the form of entitlement in different ways.

2.1 Forms of Relief

Within food relief, the main forms were the delivery of cooked food to beneficiary households, running of community kitchens where cooked food could be accessed, distributing dry ration kits, and distributing ready-to-eat dry food packets. Many NSAs undertook direct distribution – running the kitchens, distributing the food through volunteers and staff members – but also, as circumstances required, experimented with cash transfers and direct bank transfers to beneficiaries for the purchase of food when distribution was difficult either for the beneficiary to access or the NSA to provide. An innovation that was widely used by the end of the lockdowns was a direct payment transfer (often through phone based UPI applications) to local kirana stores against which beneficiaries could then take required dry food items.

Cooked food was the most prominent form of relief that served the largest number of beneficiaries. What eased access was that it required the least amount of work in verification or identification as it was usually given to anyone who demanded it or came to a cooked food centre. Yet, as we saw within state relief as well, while cooked food is a more universal form of entitlement, it can only have short-term, daily impact unlike dry food or ration both of which can be used over days and weeks. As lockdowns progressed, many beneficiaries who had access to kitchen space demanded dry ration rather than cooked food. This created difficulties in relief since ration kits

were a more resource intensive form of relief with arguably the largest delivery chains and more intensive verification requirements.

What determined which form of entitlement and its associated delivery modality was used? The viability of a particular entitlement was determined by a balance of the capacity of the organisation to provide and the beneficiaries' capacity to receive, with trade-offs lining both sides. Table 2 summarises the various factors that determined an organisation's capacity to deliver as well the recipient's capacity to receive. Each of the factors combined in different permutations to determine what kind of relief was given. For example, ration kits lowered frequency of delivery but increased the need for stable and high resource availability and required technology. Cooked food was low-technology, easier to deliver with limited resources, had a short delivery chain but a very high frequency of delivery. Beneficiaries, similarly, gained more by getting ration kits but had a much easier time accessing cooked food though the latter was at a greater risk to exposure to infection as well as required multiple transactions. We discuss each of these factors in detail in the next section. Here, we wish to highlight that the different factors that determined the choice of entitlement are not simply related to cost or narrowly financial measures as is often believed but rely deeply on supporting infrastructural, spatial and other contexts that determine what is viable as relief. The cost and effectiveness of a social protection, in other words, is determined equally by its supporting infrastructure than its direct expenses on entitlements.

Table 2 Form and Viability of Entitlements

Form of Entitlement						
		Cooked food delivered within a community	Delivery of cooked food	Delivery of dry food packets	Dry ration kit	Cash transfers for dry ration purchases
1. Organizational capacity to reach	Mobility and permissions	Low	High	High	High	N/A
	Resource stability and size	Low	Medium	Medium	High	Medium
	Frequency of delivery	High	High	High	Low	Low
	Size of the delivery chain	Low to medium [2]	Medium to high [3]	Medium to high [4]	High	Low
	Technological use	Low	Medium (GPS locations, calls for coordination)	Medium (GPS locations, calls for coordination)	High	High
	Man power	Medium to high	High	High	High	Low
	Availability and authenticity of data	Low	Low to medium	Low to medium	Low to medium	Medium
	Capacity to verify	No	No	No	High	High
2. Beneficiaries' capacity of use/ receive	Inclusion in a list	No	No (with exceptions)[5]	No (with exceptions)[6]	Yes	Yes
	Bank a/c	No	No	No	No	Yes
	Phone with call balance and internet connectivity	No	No	No	Mostly, yes[7]	Yes
	Kitchen space and cooking gas	No	No	No	Yes	Mostly, yes[8]

[2]Procurement + Cook
[3]Procurement + Cook + delivery
[4]Procurement + Cook + delivery
[5] If the organisation is already working in that geographical location then the list is essentially the whole settlement.
[6]If the organisation is already working in that geographical location then the list is essentially the whole settlement.
[7]In many cases, beneficiaries that were on the receiving end of the subdistribution at settlement or lane level did not actually come in contact with the NSAs over phone. Identification, verification and delivery, all three are overlooked by community workers or on-ground volunteers.
[8]Most of the money that went into beneficiaries' or ration shop owners' account was expected to be utilised to buy ration which eventually would need a kitchen space. Cooked food on the other side was available for free wherever it was distributed as part of relief.

2.2 Customisation, Layering and Modification

2.2.1 Layering Relief

Several NSAs were able to add a form of entitlement to their food delivery. While some of them were able to do this at the beginning of the relief work, some did it once their processes in terms of funds, manpower, and procurement were more established. Along with food, the other kinds of relief included hygiene-safety kits (face mask, hand sanitiser, gloves, soap, a small towel) and menstrual kits (sanitary napkins). Some organisations in Bengaluru and Delhi also reported being able to provide children's protein kits to the beneficiaries as they had prior knowledge of the number of children in their beneficiary base. Speaking to an activist who works in a large industrial labour community in west Delhi we found out that he was actively involved in making separate lists for children. He told us: *"I knew that the children were not getting enough nutrition with the anganwadis being shut, so apart from providing relief for families I also requested our donors to provide milk powder, eggs, and biscuits for the children."*

What went into the relief material, in some instances, also was influenced by the nature of the existing beneficiary base itself. For example, organisations that predominantly worked on gender issues and engaged in relief work had a special focus on giving out sanitary kits over and above dry ration/cooked food whereas organisations working with single male migrants or whose beneficiaries lists have men included this later on in the kit and had much lesser coverage relatively. One organisation that was studied also conducted a rapid needs assessment within its beneficiary base to understand what they required the most, and when menstrual hygiene came up as one of the pressing issues, they included menstrual kits in their relief material. A community based organisation in Delhi which primarily works on issues of housing rights also attempted to include sanitary pads for women in their kits. This was done as the organisation has been mindful of the gender gaps in their area of work and earnestly wanted to bridge these gaps during the pandemic. The convener of this unregistered CBO said: *"We have known for a while that our work needs to become more gender focused. So, we decided to ask gender activists what we could do to support the women in our beneficiary list. We were told that we could simply add sanitary napkins to our kits, which we did as a start."* Another citizen volunteer was able to procure reusable sanitary kits for the female migrant labourers amongst the beneficiaries that he was supporting. The NGO that provided the reusable kit also trained one of the female volunteers on how the pads had to be used and cleaned.

2.2.2 Customization of ration kits

Apart from the variations in the relief material, some organisations were able to customise even among each of the relief provided, especially the ration kits. One of the organisations reported that its deep familiarity with the beneficiary base helped it to customise ration kits based on what region of the country the beneficiaries came from and their culinary habits. Another organisation also reported that it did not have a standard ration kit but customised it based on who the beneficiaries were and what geographies they were located in.

NSAs using more opportunistic databases did managed simpler distinctions, for example, making a 'North Indian' and 'South Indian' ration kit. This meant that just one or two items in the kit varied, for example, rice was replaced with wheat in the North Indian ration kit. Ration kits were also customised in the month of Ramzaan for Muslim beneficiaries. These Ramzaan kits

included items such as milk and vermicelli. A citizen volunteer we spoke to said *"I felt it was important that the relief kits have milk, vermicelli and cardamom so that people can celebrate Eid. It's a small thing but I know it will give people some happiness in these difficult times."* Another volunteer shared that some beneficiaries were asking for replacements themselves. A small community of migrant workers from Bihar who got stuck in Delhi requested that they be given wheat flour instead of rice as they preferred that. The volunteer said: *"We had no idea how long the lockdown would last so I made the effort to procure wheat flour for these families so that they can eat what they know best how to prepare and prefer."*

Unlike with state actors, NSAs are able to customise, adapt, and layer entitlements, often being responsive to different contexts across space as well as time, shifting what was given at different stages of the lockdown. State actors, structured into large scale, single chain delivery systems are unable to have such flexibility. However, the constraints that NSAs face in being able to do so are also formidable especially limitations in resources. As we think of the conditions that could enable NSAs to both improve the form of entitlements they offer and work at larger scales, we turn to one of the key determinants of these practices: the infrastructures and mechanisms of delivery.

delivering Entitlements

In this section, we focus on determining the factors that shaped the modes of delivering forms of relief to identified beneficiaries. In speaking to NSAs for this study, a term that was used often was that they worked in "a fire-fighting mode." As we look at this phrase more closely, we understand it as planning and acting with limited time and resources. Certainly, relief work is characterized by precisely such uncertainty. There was never 'one final list' that was fixed and there was always prioritization involved. Strategies, modes of delivery, as well as the form of entitlements kept changing as circumstances changed. Many NSAs described how actions had to be quick even as time and resources were unstable and limited.

To assess delivery mechanisms in state relief we looked at the existing infrastructures of delivery and innovations in infrastructure and modes of delivery. A similar frame does not work for NSAs. How do we assess the delivery mechanisms within this singular idea of "fire-fighting"? From our archive, we suggest six factors that seem to determine the effectiveness of fire-fighting and the ability of relief provided by NSAs to be sustained, effective, and, indeed, possible at all. Each, we argue, is also a facet of the delivery of social protection at all times. These are:

- Delivery Chains
- Resource stability
- Mobility and permissions
- Technological use
- Identities of Beneficiaries
- The Nature of Partnerships

3.1 Delivery Chains

The steps involved in getting an entitlement to the right beneficiary can be captured in the idea of a delivery chain. For each form of entitlement, the delivery chain varies. Table 3 illustrates this for dry food packets, cooked food, dry ration kits and cash transfers.

Table 3 Delivery Chains of Different Forms of Entitlement

Entitlements	**Delivery chain**
Dry food packets	Procurement of packets or food - packaging (in some cases) - transportation – sub-distribution or direct distribution
Cooked food	Procurement of raw material - transportation - cooking - transportation - distribution
Dry ration kits	Procurement - transportation - packaging - transportation - distribution - sub distribution - (repackaging according local priorities in some cases)
Cash transfer	Online payment apps – Kirana store owners' bank account / beneficiaries' bank account

The shortest of all the delivery chains were cash transfers. Especially with lockdown restrictions, transferring cash for food became a highly efficient method with transfers going directly the beneficiary's account or to the local kirana/general provision shop owner's back account. This mode of delivery removed the component of mobility logistics from the delivery chain. However, cash transfers required the most verification compared to all the other entitlements because along with vulnerability and needs assessment, there were also verifications of the bank and phone details to make sure money reaches the intended person's account. A number of organizations also had fixed lists as to what could be bought with that money (i.e. mostly food, health and hygiene products). For example, an organization that we interviewed in Delhi told us that on-ground volunteers and kirana store owners make sure that only grains, pulses, oil, soap, sugar, salt and sanitary pads could be bought.

Cash transfers were also challenging in cases where there was no shop near enough to buy from, where there was an absence of a bank account or payment applications, or where a phone was not available. At times, on-ground volunteers mediated when accounts or phones were unavailable but this modified the delivery chain. Therefore, while cash transfers were, in theory, among the quickest forms of relief that could be provided, they depend a lot on the beneficiary's capacity to claim, receive and use the money.

Dry food packets relatively had a longer delivery chain than cash transfers but it was the shortest amongst all other forms of food-based relief. Dry and ready-to-eat food packets were distributed in conditions where the beneficiaries were stranded/moving without access to cooking infrastructure. In this delivery chain, the most difficult parts were reaching the beneficiaries and accessing mobility permissions during lockdowns.

In fact, identification almost overlapped with the moment of delivery as the organisations who delivered dry ready-to-eat food packets along the highway only had a spatial idea of where the migrants were walking but often times no idea about who they are, how long are they going to travel for and, most importantly, how many of them they would meet each time they set out on a supply run.

Cooked food was logistically more complex than a dry ration kit especially because of perishable food items being involved. Due to this reason, relatively fewer organisations were involved in the delivery of cooked food. An important distinction was when community kitchens worked to deliver cooked food, especially in Delhi where NSA-run community kitchens were seen across the city (See Table 4 for details). Dry ration kits were the most complex to procure, as well as the most expensive, requiring extensive logistical arrangements. However, once delivered, households could use them for a much longer period of time without requiring other entitlements such as cash transfer. A limit that began to emerge as lockdowns stretched was the availability of cooking gas. Only some organisations could actually procure and supply cooking gas but needed a larger set of support in terms of mobility permissions, funds and personnel needed to supply cooking gas to these localities.

Delivery chains were also longer than usual due to the social distancing norms. In case of delivery of 50 - 100 kits or more meant that recipient crowds would be larger than the permitted numbers in COVID-19 guidelines. It would then become essential to carry out door to door or lane to lane distribution in smaller groups, creating new steps in the delivery process. Many times, entitlements had to be delivered and stored at the home of a local contact person, resident volunteer, resource person or union leader who would carry out further distribution within the settlement. Houses and private spaces especially in informal settlements then became primary spaces for storage and distribution.

Delivery chains were also constantly disrupted by external factors. In fire-fighting mode, the choices between delivery chains are as much about what is possible than what is efficient or desirable. For example, two registered organisations had to rely on haphazard and sub-optimal delivery mechanisms in spite of having a full stock of food items only because they did not have transport permissions. In these cases, organisations either switched their mode of delivery or partnered with another organisation to store, transport, distribute or redistribute.

Table 4 Community Kitchens

Community kitchens were started in response to the lockdowns in many cities in India and, in particular, in our sample, in Delhi. Such kitchens are a robust example of effective delivery of safe, nutritious and regular food for beneficiaries. During the course of our research, we found that community kitchens began functioning as early as the first week of April 2020. This period was the beginning of the migrant crisis in Delhi. Led by activist collectives and citizen groups, community kitchens assisted in effectively buttressing the large scale crisis of food security that citizens were facing.

Kitchens were started by NSAs had pre-existing knowledge of the spatiality of vulnerable neighborhoods in the city and used this knowledge to target informal settlements, resettlement colonies, labour chowks, etc. Their embedded relationships in these settlements mean they could identify locations for the kitchens as well as volunteers, cooks, and local residents willing to help manage and run the kitchens. The NSAs reported choosing locations that had more residents who would not be able to make the cut offs required to receive state support (mobile phones, Aadhar cards), or areas where the need would outpace state relief efforts.

NSAs also understood social intricacies in these neighbourhoods that could lead to increased vulnerabilities. For example, a community kitchen was set up in a neighbourhood next to a large industrial area which has a large population of single men such as factory workers and rickshaw pullers. These men depended on local dhabas for their food needs during other times. Furthermore, NSAs immediately caught the problem of families running out of cooking gas as private gas agencies were shut during the lockdown. This meant that ration kits could not be used by the beneficiaries and cooked food would have to be provided. This localized knowledge and quick feedback mechanisms speeded up the responses of this form of delivery.

As we spoke to activists and beneficiaries to understand the mechanisms of how the community kitchens functioned, we found that beneficiaries preferred to eat at community kitchens rather than state-run hunger relief centres, for example, saying that the quality and quantity of the food was better. Further, many community kitchens were closer to the homes of the beneficiaries, making access to them easier. The waiting time was reduced, making the beneficiaries relatively safer from contracting COVID19 infection.

One beneficiary we spoke to said, “the food at the community kitchen was well made and had a variety of options every day. The community kitchen was inside the community whereas the government food centres were far away and difficult to walk to in the summer heat. Therefore, whenever we could, we prefered to eat at our local [community] kitchen instead.”

The NSAs also built valuable knowledge on the economics of running community kitchens. One large activist collective that we spoke to was able to give us the following break up of running a community centre: the cost of one meal at a community centre was about Rs. 25. If milk and other supplements such as boiled eggs are added for children, the cost of the meal

increased to Rs. 44. The capacity of one community centre (with a cook, cleaner and staff to safely distribute the food) is anywhere between 100 to 300 meals at a time. Most community kitchens provided meals twice a day. Beneficiaries could also pack and take the meal back to their homes to consume instead of having to sit outside the community kitchen and eat the meal without masks, etc. The budget for a community centre providing a total of 400 meals twice is reported to be around 2 lakh rupees per month. Many community centres also kept oximeters, infrared thermometers and turned the community kitchen space into a health centre as well. This had an additional one-time cost of Rs. 5,000.

The community kitchens also became information centres on various aspects of COVId19 as well as on various rules and regulations of the lockdown, such as learning ways to protect themselves by maintaining social distance and wearing masks in public spaces. Furthermore, the community kitchens at times provided masks and dry ration kits to beneficiaries, though this was not their primary function. They also became a place for building community leadership, with people of all ages and gender participating in various aspects of running the community kitchens. Lastly, the community kitchens became the centre of solidarity amongst residents during the harsh lockdowns. These acts of solidarity were welcome since the lockdowns saw many people lose their livelihoods and some even their lives. If documented, this experiment can provide valuable insights on how to upscale these centres and make them a more permanent fixture within state social policy.

3.2 Resource stability

As would be expected with NSAs, the availability and stability of resources is a major factor influencing the effectiveness of delivery. Resources here were not just financial but included, for example, access to supplies and manpower. From our interviews, key resources that shaped delivery were:

- Financial Resources: Many NSAs reported that financial support from donors was unstable, and it made even short-term planning difficult thereby making NSAs unable to build sustained relief programmes. Here, the scale of the NSA mattered deeply. Relatively well established organisations had more stability. NSAs with an unstable donor base and support believed that they could have planned with more certainty if resources were stable. Volunteers from an association of housing rights activists in Delhi, for example, repeatedly stressed that they had capacity to deliver but an unstable donor base made it difficult to plan. Everything, they argued, remained spontaneous even with large capacities in place to carry out relief work. It is important to note that no NSAs reported accessing state funding or support even as they were undertaking relief work.

- Procurement: The disruption of supply chains meant that specific items began to be impossible to access by NSAs. For example, NSAs reported that oil began to be unavailable to add to ration kits, that milled wheat became difficult to access as grinding units were in lockdown, etc.

Here again, the absence of directing scarce supply to institutions doing relief was deeply felt. In multiple instances, especially in large cities such as Delhi and Bangalore, organisations reported that initially various items of the kit were available at a reasonable cost but soon that changed. Increasing prices further put stress on resource planning. However, some well-established organisations did mention during interviews that there was sometimes informal indications from members of local government that allowed them to procure essential items before public lockdown announcements cause inflationary spikes. This was not the case for individuals and NGOs who are operating at a smaller scale and with lesser number of beneficiaries and manpower. This increase in the cost particularly affected NSAs that relied on crowd funding than NSAs who had financially stable donors. Most organisations irrespective of capacity or size faced initial problems with procuring various items and the first few days were all about obtaining mobility permissions and negotiations with the police.

- People: The role of human resources was the most essential not only when it came to delivery but through all other stages of relief activity. The extent of engagement with residents, staff and volunteers is to be noted and lauded yet requirements of manpower were never sufficient to manage the scale of operations. What is important to note is that it was partnerships with residents, local volunteers and hyper-local community groups that made delivery viable at all. In such situations, these workers are, in essence, frontline delivery workers. Such workers can also be seen as actors well placed to evaluate both state and NSA relief activities. Even activities such as verificiation and needs assessment become much more efficient because of resident volunteers. Such volunteers were much more prominent in cases of organisations that had pre-existing community mobilisers for other welfare projects or surveys that they otherwise carry out. This pre-existing capacity of both the resident volunteers in quickly understanding the situation and acting upon it as well as the organisations having access to these people helped facilitate a lot of relief work.

  It was these workers that, in many cases, were able to redirect resources when needed and suggest ways to overcome duplication issues. For example, a Housing rights activist organisation in Delhi with volunteers in many communities was used by many NSAs to deliver relief because of the thickness of their presence in communities. This helped them know exactly where the shortage was and thus the excess resources could be redirected to areas that had scarcity of relief material. In another instance, a union that has been working for a long time with communities across multiple states were able to point out where exactly were the ration kits had to go and even respective governments went with their judgment, in rare cases of state-NSA partnerships within our sample.

3.3 Mobility and permissions

Processes of obtaining permissions, border passes, E-passes etc. added a number of procedural steps and hurdles in the delivery process. A number of organisations hired transport agencies. Some organisations and individuals used their private vehicles. Others maneuvered using permissions and some by developing rapport with the police while others relied on others who had necessary permissions. Yet the nature of the lockdowns

meant that relief work was consistently layered with delays and harassment. Here again, well-established NSAs, especially one that historically partnered with the state, or that could access embedded individuals, found it easier to get permissions or find support for mobility.

3.4 Technological use

Technology played an important role in delivering relief to beneficiaries. Online cash transfer applications such as PayTM, Google Pay, and internet banking portals increased direct cash transfers to beneficiaries from NSAs across the country. Examples from all major cities show a tremendous increase in direct cash transfers as a way to safely and quickly reach beneficiaries to provide a variety of entitlements such as dry ration, medicine, travel tickets, and even the payment of rents. The technology also made redundant the physical distance between the NSA and beneficiary with online payments made across cities and states.

In order to overcome a lack of registered bank accounts, access to smartphones or even knowledge of online payment gateways, NSAs innovated by transferring money directly to food shops, chemists, and landlords, who then passed on the entitlement to beneficiaries. This adaptability in cash transfer technologies helped NSAs to reach to a much larger beneficiary base during the lockdowns. However, unlike the imagination of a frictionless technological interface, these are still deeply mediated transfers. The owner of the kirana store, the chemist, the landlord all had to be contacted, spoken to, and convinced of the genuineness of the transaction. Timing had to be worked out – when the payment would reach the store and when the beneficiary would get there to draw food items against the credit transfer. In a sense, online payment gateways are both technological as well as deeply social forms of delivery.

The role played by mobile technology also meant that data recharges on phones were in themselves a critical form of relief that many needed. Indeed, NSAs in Delhi and Madhya Pradesh reported 'topping up' prepaid phone numbers so that beneficiaries could receive messages, register on portals, receive benefits, apply for travel passes, or just call home. Technology, in other words, requires infrastructural support at an individual user level just as much as any other service.

A critical role that technology also played was to connect NSAs with each other. NSAs within themselves connected with each other using technology platforms to increase their spatial reach, partner with each other to increase the kinds of relief that they were providing to people as well as to share resources and information with each other. For helplines, masking softwares allowed volunteers to offer help without sharing their own personal numbers or information, and also allowed one single number to be used by beneficiaries wherever they were, leading to easy recall.

3.5 Identities

Delivery was mediated by identity in many ways. As we discussed earlier, social, demographic and occupational identities were used to identify beneficiaries in both positive ways that recognised differential vulnerabilities but also negatively as the basis of prejudice. Discrimination was indeed observed within relief work. NSAs reported instances of volunteers who belonged to certain communities getting discriminated against by the beneficiaries themselves. For instance, in Bengaluru, Muslim volunteers who went to distribute food packets to a settlement were sent back. Similarly, in Delhi, Muslim volunteers were stopped and detained more frequently than volunteers of other religions. Food supplies going into areas with significant Muslim neighbourhoods were reported to be stopped more frequently by the police.

Discrimination was also reported against 'outsiders' to a state. In Bengaluru, there was pressure from the local leaders, in one case, to provide relief only to the people who had voter cards from the state. Due to this, many out-of-state migrants were left out of beneficiary lists. Occupational categories like sex work, already long stigmatized, were left out of state relief in many cases, facing an additional layer of invisibility. At times, NSAs were able specifically focus on reaching such communities but there was no consistent pattern that could be discerned, and, in some cities, NSAs were equally absent from relief work to specific occupational categories.

Pre-existing prejudices and social vulnerabilities due to caste, class, religious identity, race and region continued to disenfranchise certain communities. The biggest example from the city of Delhi was the areas of Northeast Delhi which had been hit by communal violence in February. With the onset of the COVID19 pandemic the few post-violence relief camps that had been set up were closed down by the government. The pandemic became a larger threat and the relief work on the recent communal violence in these areas was stopped. This increased the vulnerability of affected people who now also had to deal with the impacts of the lockdown and the pandemic.

3.6 The Nature of Partnerships

Delivery within NSAs relies, arguably disproportionately, on partnerships. As Table 5 shows, each type of activity required within delivery chains had a set of actors involved. While this may be heightened during relief and the nature of the lockdowns, partnerships repeatedly emerged as a critical infrastructure that determined the effectiveness of delivery. How effective delivery was, how each step in the delivery chain was managed, was often determined by the depth of partnerships NSAs could set up and sustain.

Partnership, in the context of NSAs, does not necessarily mean a formal arrangement but a collaborative effort towards a shared goal. The nature of collaboration is often not written or recorded nor is it structured through formal agreements. This made partnerships very fluid and flexible but, as we have argued earlier, also with unclear terms of accountability. As the situations around each lockdown changed, different types of partnerships started to emerge resulting from the combination of two main conditions. The first was when NSAs had information, i.e. the ability to identify beneficiaries as we detailed in the opening section of this paper, but lacked the capacity – means, delivery mechanisms, financial resources – to deliver relief. The second was when resources – financial or in terms of delivery infrastructure – existed but remained unmatched to information.

NSAs constantly made partnerships to overcome one of these two deficits, or a specific part within them. For example, an organisation with capacity sought the identification databases of one with information; whereas one with reach to communities sought partnerships with organisations that had the capacity to deliver. Both kinds of organisations, as we have argued, needed financial resources typically offered by a third party or donor. For instance: An established organisation in Delhi (who also carried out relief in other big cities) told us that they had found it impossible during the first four days of the lockdown to deliver items to vulnerable populations. As soon as they realised that another organisation had started delivering, they immediately got in touch and started to get their items delivered as well. A second set of organisations who had set up helplines or information gateways started building partnerships with organisations that may have the capacity to deliver but could not utilise it optimally without databases.

The nature of partnerships also varied depending on the type of entitlement. Organisations that mostly relied on cash

Figure 2 Mapping Partnerships

transfers did not have to get into a partnership with another individuals or organisations. Organisations that sought to delivery multiple types of entitlements more frequently sought partnerships to augment their capacity. At times partnerships were set up to enable shared access to delivery infrastructure. For instance, a well-established NSA that worked in large cities of India gave access to storage spaces not only to other NSAs but also to state agencies without charging rents.

What is important is that these were not always planned, institutional or consciously designed collaborations. Often, partnerships emerged contextually, as NSAs were thrown together in difficult circumstances where without co-operation it was not possible to move forward. Sometimes, partnerships were for specific and limited activities, or for a singular instance. Yet the extent of partnerships also indicates the creation of an eco-system that made all NSAs more open to collaboration and that, in many cases, encouraged if not facilitated interaction and co-operation. Delivery mechanisms often existed or emerged precisely because certain partnerships became possible. Relief, in a sense, became collectively imagined as NSAs reported seeking each other out early and often, in what one interviewee described as a reversal of a normally siloed sector of practice. It is a lesson, as we shall see in the concluding section that holds great learning for what relief has to offer us as lessons for a post-COVID world.

Table 5 Flashforward: The Delhi Co-Ordinated Relief Network 2021

While this report covers lockdowns from the first waves of COVID-19 in 2020, a flashforward of sorts can help in how learnings from this wave had already begun to change practices in for the COVID-19 lockdowns to come in 2021. In the lockdowns in the COVID-19 second waves in March-May, 2021, NSAs involved in the distribution of dry ration kits in Delhi drew from their realisation of the necessity of partnerships, their anxieties about identification and verification, as well as the need to be effective during delivery, to change their modality of relief.

The informal networks that had characterised relief in 2020 became a single co-ordinated relief platform called the Delhi Co-Ordinated Relief Network. Brought together by two or three embedded individuals, and held formally by one registered organisation in the city, the Network had nearly fifty NSAs within it ranging from citizens groups, registered NGOs, unions, unregistered collectives and individuals. Most – at least three of every four – had been involved in food relief during the lockdowns in 2020. The Network then accessed a single large resource fund from a single donor who, in turn, was encouraged by the scale of impact a network promised. The Network met and ran entirely online given lockdown conditions, with weekly meetings on Zoom. Different organisations took responsibility to aggregate demand from communities they knew already, or, in the case of Membership-based groups, like the Wastepicker Unions, their membership. The process of acquiring vendors, aggregating material, and arranging transport was centralised to the Network, with each partners taking responsibility to receive and locally distribute among communities they knew.

This Network proved immensely successful. Nearly 70,000 households were reached across the two month despite strict and difficult lockdown conditions, and they represented a deep, distributed delivery coverage by mixing spatial identification as well as occupational and social groups. A single Google Drive link was open to all members of the Network where demands were logged. The ability of all members to see all demands in one place at any time aided transparency and trust, and also reduced duplication, with members seeing that some neighbourhoods were already being serviced by other Network members. Communities also realised that different organisations they were speaking to were part of the same Network thus reducing hoarding, especially from well-connected individuals who often raised excess resources from multiple actors during the 2020 lockdowns. Resource stability was no longer an issue given that combined ability of the network to raise resources but also because of a single large donor that was willing to support the network in its entirety. Members of the network have since gone on to work on vaccination in a similar fashion, indicating the endurance of such partnerships once they have been established.

Implications and Lessons

What are the lessons we can draw out for the role of NSAs not just in providing relief but as part of an ecosystem of the delivery of social protection? We highlight key lessons that relief can offer in moving in this direction.

4.1 NSAs are Social Infrastructure: In our report on state relief, we argued that one of the strongest indicators of the effectiveness of relief was the strength of the public institutions and social protection systems before the crisis. With NSAs, this finding applies equally. We argue that relief underscores the need to think of NSAs as a social infrastructure. Where this infrastructure was well-established, networked, recognised and equitably distributed before the crisis, its ability to respond to a crisis was heightened, more efficient, faster, and more sustained through the lockdowns.

Thinking of NSAs as an infrastructure also suggests that we think of them in terms of systems and networks rather than individual sectors or organisations. Relief work in COVID-19 has shown us that NSAs can switch across multiple forms of social protection needs – from food to work to health and back – as well as work at the intersection of different scales and publics as needed, moving across spatial communities to occupational or social groups. Like other infrastructural forms, however, they require eco-systems and enabling frameworks that encourage them to work in co-operation, aggregation and alignment. Thinking of NSAs as an infrastructure also allows us to assess the publics they reach but those they don't, moving beyond just thinking of them as filling 'gaps,' or closing the 'last mile' and instead seeing them as capable of scalar and geographically distributed action. This requires thinking of ways of investing in the building of both NSAs as well as a regulatory, financial and cultural infrastructure that supports them. Some of the practices we suggest below do precisely this.

4.2 Supporting Collectivisation: One clear lesson is that membership-based organisations – unions, co-operatives, associations – are an institutional form almost ideally suited to the delivery of social protection in both crisis and the

everyday. These NSAs were able to respond the fastest; adapt and customise relief; be accountable to their members; engage in multiple forms of relief; as well as deploy administrative capabilities at scale. They were also the organisations that members turned to, indicating a sense of ownership and claims-making that bodes well for social protection systems. NSAs that worked on project or intervention bases also had a capacity to respond but not to the same depth, and it was unclear if their role could transition from a crisis response to everyday institutional delivery of social protection.

Supporting existing collectivisation and enabling new collective institutions, especially within the informal economy, requires changes in the ways the state views, recognizes and regulates such collectives. Creating regulatory frameworks that are specifically designed to enable incorporation for collectives of informal workers, recognising existing collectives formally, and entering into partnerships for the participatory design and delivery of social protection systems could be the basis of repairing the patchwork urban safety nets that COVID has revealed once more.

4.3 State-NSA partnerships in Relief: The second lesson in eco-system approaches to building up NSAs is to think about partnerships. In a recent survey of members of India's Administrative Services, a significant number – 59.4% - rated the role of NSAs in delivering relief during the pandemic positively. Yet, in our study, this appreciation is not emerging from or translating into meaningful partnerships between the state and non-state actors that could anchor effective relief protection as well as possibly offer new ways of imagining the delivery of social protection in a post-COVID world.

Much NSA relief work happens 'despite the state' (Rakshekhar 2020). The ability of NSAs to anchor meso-scaled provision – whether as crisis relief or as everyday social protection – depends significantly on partnering with the state on a set of key processes. They are: (a) sharing of data so that NSAs may direct relief to either augment state provision or specifically reach beyond its limits (for e.g. in areas where the state can't reach, to those without state identification); (b) being aided in resource procurement at scale (in the case of food, this would be wholesale supply of wheat or rice, for example); (c) financing, or at least viability gap funding, that reduces NSA reliance on donors; (d) administrative assistance in permissions and, indeed, protections from the policing arm of the state; and (e) trust, recognition and acknowledgement of the central role NSAs play both before, during and post crisis.

In multiple cases in our study, we noted how NSAs were unable to use their entire capacity and potential because of these gaps. Their partnerships with each other elevated their capacity and increased their efficiency. Yet scalar shifts in their reach are possible only with partnerships with different parts of the state. Building these partnerships before the crisis, for the delivery of everyday social protection, would then build a resilient care infrastructure capable of not just responding to shocks and crisis, but also moving to transformative social protection systems that can help families move from coping and surviving to thriving and growing.

4.4 Innovation and Technology: NSAs can act as a significant site of learning in terms of flexibility, adaptiveness and innovation in the provision of relief and social protection. The multiple ways in which NSAs identified

beneficiaries, found ways to be accessible to claims, found ways to reach those in need, and kept changing processes as the situation evolved have significant lessons for relief provision as well as the design of social protection systems. That this flexibility comes partly from working in particular places at meso-scale also has implications that caution against deeply centralised systems of the delivery of social protection, as well as the need for state-NSA partnerships that allows both localised knowledge but large scale standardised delivery.

Particularly important to document further is the use, potentials and limits of technology. One the one hand, new forms of applications, WhatsApp groups, and digital payment infrastructures are already becoming a foundational part of social protection systems. On the other, the continuing importance of face to face interaction, physical delivery systems like cooked food centres, and helplines is also evident.

Denying the central role of technology due to concerns of a digital divide appears, from our study, to be as equally short-sighted as treating a digital pivot as a panacea that can replace forms of engagement and institutional delivery that hold onto proximate, brick and mortar presence. The example of community kitchens is a case in point. While technology may enable precise doorstep delivery of entitlements, the kitchen allows both a low-barrier, more universal access that doesn't require any engagement – even signing up on an application – and has a series of other social and spatial effects that cannot be captured simply by thinking about more efficient technology-based delivery chains.

Looking at relief reminds us of the plurality of publics and lifeworlds that still exist in our cities – wired and unwired – into which we must adapt the technological so that it may take root within the everyday rather than seek to 'transform' it. Relief work with NSAs and state actors has shown us that the technological can act as both as an enabler but also a gatekeeper in accessing social protection, and learning when it becomes one or the other, and for whom, is a key area for urban research and practice going forward.

4.5 Importance of Community Organizing: One of the key findings in our report is the importance of associational life within communities. By associational life, we mean the thickness of ways in which people come together – in youth groups, resident associations, self-help groups, as formal or informal hyper-local organisations that hold communities together. Relief showed us that without no NSAs would have been able to perform the roles they did without communities being able to receive this relief, direct its use, as well as hold NSAs and each other accountable. Indeed, communities that had high degrees of associational life were likely able to direct more relief towards them at a time of crisis, scarcity, and trade-offs. When that relief came to communities, it was residents that aided and, in some cases, also led, beneficiary identification, verification and relief distribution. The presence of such actors at community level enabled NSAs to not over-emphasize verification and be more concerned with wrongful exclusion than false inclusion.

Mobilised communities were treated as valuable and needed partners during relief in a way that they are rarely treated in everyday governance, where they are reduced merely to passive recipients of state or non-state entitlements. One of the key lessons for relief by both state and non-state actors is to build more equitable partnerships with residents and informal community associational forms. It is also imperative in the work of everyday activism

in our cities to encourage such associational life in vulnerable communities.

4.6 Frameworks of Accountability: As the role of NSAs expand, a note of caution is also important that adequate frameworks of accountability must be established. The fact that NSAs aren't subject to the kind of accountability as state actors gives them flexibility and adaptiveness that one values but it also means that appropriate frameworks of accountability are not easily available. NSAs, for example, can choose to focus on particular populations or geographies – how do we balance this right to choose publics from more universal imaginations of leaving no one behind? What happens when such choices become discriminatory or exclusionary, both when the NSA is a victim of discrimination or when it is its agent?

Different forms of NSAs offer lessons in how this accountability can be created in different ways. Membership based organisations are accountable to their members, for example, in a way that shapes their practices from the very beginning. NSAs rooted spatially in particular neighbourhoods and communities are accountable by their presence. It is important not to reduce accountability to questions of audit alone. In an ecosystem approach to NSAs, for example, one way to hold equity at a system level is to work with a diverse range of NSAs so as to prevent any one organisation from becoming a gateway to entitlements, or having the shared responsibility between state provision and NSAs be transparent and clearly defined. Yet as the role of NSAs grows both within and beyond crisis, an appropriate and co-produced framework of accountability will be necessary.

We began this report by arguing that COVID-19 and their attendant lockdowns, along with the relief work that they necessitated and inspired, offer an archive of learning and unlearning for us all. In this report, by focusing on NSAs, we have sought to offer insights into how to hold the lessons that relief offers not just for the next pandemic but for everyday social protection before the next crisis. Since the time of this research, a second wave and new sets of lockdowns have passed in the summer of 2021. Some of the authors of this report have then, ironically, had a chance to practice some of the lessons of this analysis even before we had a chance to publish, as recounted in Box 2 above. In a way, as the line between crisis and the everyday thins even further, this is perhaps fitting. NSAs learnt by doing, as we have in the framing and formulation of this report, with knowledge quickly circulating between text and field, things changing around us even as we sought to capture what was happening at any given moment in time. As we try to move forward, we hope that recognising and building on the strength, courage, and dedication of NSAs is one of the legacies of this pandemic that remains, even as the memories of the difficulties that gave rise to the need for this courage, fade.

Annexure

USN	Type of NSA	Rural/ Urban/ Peri-Urban/ All	Entitlements	Beneficiary	Total Beneficiaries covered
NSA_01	Restaurant (Non-profit initiative)	Urban	Food - Ration kits (cooked meals)	Need-based, existing beneficiary lists from partner organizations	100+ families
NSA_02	NPO	Peri-urban	Food - Dry Ration (rice, 25 kg; lentils, 6 kg; sugar, 2 kg; salt, 1kg; wheat, 5kg; cooking oil, 3 L), snacks for migrants waiting near the police station and railway station Travel support - cash transfer Health/Medical/ Mental health support - Hygiene kits (toothpaste, detergent, soap, and four masks)	Construction migrants, Need-based	5000 families
NSA_03	NPO	Urban + Rural	Food - Dry ration kits, packed meals Health/Medical/Mental health support - Medicines	Existing beneficiary list, need-based	68,80,000 individuals and families
NSA_04	NPO	Urban + Rural	Food - Cooked food, dry ration kits, vegetables directly from farm Health/Medical/Mental health support - Hygiene products (Masks; Sanitary napkins; Soap etc.)	Need-based	71,600 families

USN	Type of NSA	Rural/ Urban/ Peri-Urban/ All	Entitlements	Beneficiary	Total Beneficiaries covered
NSA_05	NPO	All	Food - Dry ration kits Health/Medical/Mental health support - Hygiene kits	Migrant workers	1,200 families
NSA_06	Volunteer organiza-tion	Urban + Rural	Food - Ration kits, lunch packets Health/Medical/Mental health support - medical support	Need-based, migrants, and daily wage workers	~1,75,000 individuals
NSA_07	NGO	All	Food - Dry Ration Kits Health/Medical/Mental health support - Tele Counselling, Medicines	Need-based, transgenders, and sex workers	3,500 individuals
NSA_08	NPO	Urban	Health/Medical/Mental health support - PPE kits (500 PPE, 1000 masks), medicines to hospitals, and hand sanitisers	Cancer patients	3 hospitals
NSA_09	Individual	Urban	Food - Ration kits	Need-based (auto drivers and street vendors)	50-60 individuals

USN	Type of NSA	Rural/ Urban/ Peri-Urban/ All	Entitlements	Beneficiary	Total Beneficiaries covered
NSA_10	Individual	All	Food - Food box (500-750 ml containers packed with cooked food), bread and milk for households with kids, ration kits (rice, 7 kg; atta, 4-5 kg; lentils, 2-3 kgs; oil, 1L; masalas; sugar; salt; pickle; vegetables)	Migrant workers with no ration card, auto drivers, and taxi drivers	~8000 individuals
NSA_11	Restaurant (Non-profit initiative)	All	Food - Food packets, ration kits (rice, 5 kg; atta, 2 kg; lentils, 1kg; salt, 1 kg; sugar, 1kg; refined sunflower oil, 1 L; milk, 1/2 L; tea powder, 1 sachet) Health/Medical/Mental health support - cloth masks to those individuals/families provided with food packets/ration kits.	Poor people, people at construction sites, migrant labourers, daily wage workers, need-based	~1,70,000 individuals (Food packets) ~2,500 families (Rations kits) (ration kits for another 1,500 families were in the pipeline at the time of the interview)
NSA_12	Educational institute (Non-profit initiative)	All	Food - food packets, ration kits (South Indian and North Indian kits) Housing Support - Shelter to migrant workers	Migrants (individuals/ families from another state i.e states apart from Karnataka; those without ration card or Karnataka voter ID)	6,000 individuals (food packets) 780 families (ration kits) 26 individuals (housing support)
NSA_13	NPO	All	Food - Packed food Health/Medical/Mental health support - Sanitary products, helpline for access to sexual reproductive health information, and women's health products.	Existing beneficiary list of vulnerable communities and those living in temporary shelters	5,000 individuals (food supply) 2,300-2,400 individuals (health products)

USN	Type of NSA	Rural/ Urban/ Peri-Urban/ All	Entitlements	Beneficiary	Total Beneficiaries covered
NSA_14	NGO	All	Food - Grocery kits (rice, 5 kg; pulses, 2 kg; wheat flour, 5 kg; oil, 2 L; basic spices; biscuits), cooked meals Health/Medical/Mental health support - Helpline for mental health support, medicines, other essentials	Migrant workers	N/A
NSA_15	NPO	All	Food - Grocery kits (quantity of items dependent on the size of family), lunch and dinner campaign Health/Medical/Mental health support - COVID-19 awareness campaign in villages, masks, sanitisers, medicines for pregnant women and babies, mental health helpline for telephonic counselling	Poor people, vulnerable people, lower- and middle-class people	1,73,000 Larger households (8 people family) 4,43,000 Individuals/ Smaller households
NSA_16	NPO	Urban	Food - Food packets & grocery kits (rice, 5/7/10 kg; atta, 2 kg; tuhar dal, 1 kg; sugar, 1 kg; salt, 1 kg; oil, 1 kg; 2 soaps)	Migrant labours, daily wage workers, specially challenged, house helps, security guards, senior citizens, and children orphanages	2,000+ individuals

USN	Type of NSA	Rural/ Urban/ Peri-Urban/ All	Entitlements	Beneficiary	Total Beneficiaries covered
NSA_17	Volunteer Organisa-tion	Urban	Food - Dry ration supply, cooked food Health/Medical/Mental health support - Awareness on social distancing, medical support	Migrant workers, daily wage earners, senior citizens, and slum dwellers	N/A
NSA_18	NGO	Urban	Food - Ration kits (rice, dal and oil), Nutrition kits (for only HIV infected individuals) (different types of dal, nutrition powders, dry fruits) Health/Medical/Mental health support - Medicines	Trans women	1,300 individuals
NSA_19	Citizen Collective	All	Food - Connecting various volunteer organizations, collaborating with government agencies to create food security, leverage Indira canteens, use the Public Distribution System (PDS)	Need-based, existing beneficiary lists	N/A
NSA_20	NPO	Urban + Peri-urban	Food - Ration kits (rice, atta, dal non-perishable items.) Vegetables could not be provided, however, they funded the purchase of these items. For those homes with children below the age of 6, lactogen was added to the kit. Housing Support - Cash transfers for children homes and childcare institutions.	Children in need of care and protection	840 children (rations kits) 200 children (cash transfers (cash transfers to support homes for 300-400 children were in the pipeline at the time of the interview)

USN	Type of NSA	Rural/ Urban/ Peri-Urban/ All	Entitlements	Beneficiary	Total Beneficiaries covered
NSA_21	Individual	Urban	Food - Ration kits, cooked food Health/Medical/Mental health support - Domestic violence and harassment support Travel support - An online campaign to call the MP demanding safe transport of migrant workers back to their homes	Housekeeping staff, destitute homes, need-based	N/A
NSA_22	Social Impact Organisa-tion	Urban	Food - Care kits (dry rations), children's protein kits Health/Medical/Mental health support - Children's hygiene kits, women's hygiene kits, healthcare access, livelihood assistance.	Existing beneficiary list of waste pickers and migrant workers	15,000 individuals
NSA_23	Social Impact Organisa-tion	Urban	Food - Ration kits	Daily wage workers	N/A
NSA_24	Citizen Collective	Urban	Food - Ration kits, cooked food, Travel support - Tickets for migrant workers	Need-based	8000 families
NSA_25	Individual	Urban	Food - Food packets, dry ration kits, milk, curd, food for migrant workers travelling back home	Need-based but focused on poor people, widows, old people, autorickshaw drivers, and migrant workers,	1,300 families (dry ration kits) 15,000 individuals (food packets)

USN	Type of NSA	Rural/ Urban/ Peri-Urban/ All	Entitlements	Beneficiary	Total Beneficiaries covered
NSA_26	Individual	Urban	Food - Dry Ration (rice,dal, atta, sugar, oil, etc.)	Need-Based, people without ration cards	10,000 families
NSA_27	Individual	Urban + Rural	Food - Ration kits	Need-based	1,500-2,000 families
NSA_28	Individual	Urban + Rural	Food - Dry ration kits Travel support - cash transfer	Need-based	~1,000 individuals
NSA_29	NGO	Urban	Dry ration kit 5kg Rice 5 Kg wheat flour Sugar 1 ltr oil	Beneficiaries through surveys of vulnerability; incremental selection; mostly street vendors and construction workers	1500 families
NSA_30	NGO	Urban	Medical, safety, hygiene kit- Masks Gloves Sanitizer Medicines Sanitary pads	Beneficiaries through surveys of vulnerability; incremental selection; mostly street vendors and construction workers	1500 families
NSA 31	CBO	Urban/ Peri Urban	Food - Dry ration kits (20 Kgs rice, 15 Kgs wheat flour, 5 Kgs Pulses, 1 Litre mustard oil, spices. Cooked Food Packets Hygiene Kit - 1Pack of sanitary pads (only given to women), soap, masks, gloves and a small towel.	street vendors, construction workers, waste pickers, widows,single mothers, & disabled persons	16,257 families

USN	Type of NSA	Rural/ Urban/ Peri-Urban/ All	Entitlements	Beneficiary	Total Beneficiaries covered
NSA_31	NGO/Union	Urban + Rural	Dry ration kits: Dal, Chawal, Masalas, Sugar, Tea, Child nutrition kits: Milk packets, Biscuits from Need Foundation Hygiene kit, Sanitary pads, Soaps	Urban poor from slum communities	
NSA_32	NGO	Urban + Rural	Food: for homeless and migrants. Mostly cooked food and dry instant food packets Health and hygiene: safety kits provided to individuals all across the city and mostly people in bastis and migrants COVID Awareness: Awareness related to various entitlements during the pandemic as well as government, health and mobility guidelines and restrictions Government subsidies mobilized: Awareness and facilitating cash transfer as well as prioritizing beneficiaries	Urban poor from slum communities	Food: 30466 Health and hygiene (safety kits to individuals): 55643 Housing support: 3957612 Travel support: 5916 COVID Awareness: 590 Government subsidies mobilized (INR): 800000

USN	Type of NSA	Rural/ Urban/ Peri-Urban/ All	Entitlements	Beneficiary	Total Beneficiaries covered
	NGO	Urban	Food: for homeless and migrants. Mostly cooked food and dry instant food packets Health and hygiene: safety kits provided to individuals all across the city and mostly people in bastis and migrants COVID Awareness: Awareness related to various entitlements during the pandemic as well as government, health and mobility guidelines and restrictions Government subsidies mobilized: Awareness and facilitating cash transfer as well as prioritizing beneficiaries	Urban poor from slum communities	Food: 25367 Scheme awareness: 25367 Health and hygiene (safety kits to individuals): 2880 Food support (INR): 919884 Travel support: 5916 COVID Awareness: 290 Government subsidies mobilized (INR): 3353800

USN	Type of NSA	Rural/ Urban/ Peri-Urban/ All	Entitlements	Beneficiary	Total Beneficiaries covered
NSA_33	NGO	Urban	Food: for homeless and migrants. Mostly cooked food and dry instant food packets Health and hygiene: safety kits provided to individuals all across the city and mostly people in bastis and migrants COVID Awareness: Awareness related to various entitlements during the pandemic as well as government, health and mobility guidelines and restrictions Government subsidies mobilized: Awareness and facilitating cash transfer as well as prioritizing beneficiaries	Urban poor from slum communities	No. of beneficiaires reached (COVID awareness): 57010 No. of beneficiaires reached (scheme awareness): 26676 Food support (no. of meals): 1222393 Safety kits: 2237 Government subsidies mobilized (INR): 1179900

USN	Type of NSA	Rural/ Urban/ Peri-Urban/ All	Entitlements	Beneficiary	Total Beneficiaries covered
NSA_34	NGO	Urban	Food: for homeless and migrants. Mostly cooked food and dry instant food packets Health and hygiene: safety kits provided to individuals all across the city and mostly people in bastis and migrants COVID Awareness: Awareness related to various entitlements during the pandemic as well as government, health and mobility guidelines and restrictions Government subsidies mobilized: Awareness and facilitating cash transfer as well as prioritizing beneficiaries	Urban poor from slum communities	No. of beneficiaries reached (COVID awareness): 10146 No. of beneficiaries reached (scheme awareness): 5739 Food support (no. of meals): 2466780 Safety kits: 4500 Government subsidies mobilized (INR): 1088394

USN	Type of NSA	Rural/ Urban/ Peri-Urban/ All	Entitlements	Beneficiary	Total Beneficiaries covered
NSA_35	NGO	Urban	Food: for homeless and migrants. Mostly cooked food and dry instant food packets Health and hygiene: safety kits provided to individuals all across the city and mostly people in bastis and migrants COVID Awareness: Awareness related to various entitlements during the pandemic as well as government, health and mobility guidelines and restrictions Government subsidies mobilized: Awareness and facilitating cash transfer as well as prioritizing beneficiaries	Urban poor from slum communities	No. of beneficiaries reached (COVID awareness): 80968 No. of beneficiaires reached (scheme awareness): 80968 Food support (no. of meals): 1567890 Safety kits: 1152 Government subsidies mobilized (INR): 476400

USN	Type of NSA	Rural/ Urban/ Peri-Urban/ All	Entitlements	Beneficiary	Total Beneficiaries covered
NSA_36	NGO	Urban	Food: for homeless and migrants. Mostly cooked food and dry instant food packets Health and hygiene: safety kits provided to individuals all across the city and mostly people in bastis and migrants COVID Awareness: Awareness related to various entitlements during the pandemic as well as government, health and mobility guidelines and restrictions Government subsidies mobilized: Awareness and facilitating cash transfer as well as prioritizing beneficiaries	Urban poor from slum communities	No. of beneficiaires reached (COVID awareness): 137088 No. of beneficiaires reached (scheme awareness): 39974 Food support (no. of meals): 67505 Safety kits: 1672 Government subsidies mobilized (INR): 377020

USN	Type of NSA	Rural/ Urban/ Peri-Urban/ All	Entitlements	Beneficiary	Total Beneficiaries covered
NSA_37	NGO	Urban	Food: for homeless and migrants. Mostly cooked food and dry instant food packets Health and hygiene: safety kits provided to individuals all across the city and mostly people in bastis and migrants COVID Awareness: Awareness related to various entitlements during the pandemic as well as government, health and mobility guidelines and restrictions Government subsidies mobilized: Awareness and facilitating cash transfer as well as prioritizing beneficiaries	Urban poor from slum communities	No. of beneficiaires reached (COVID awareness): 27950 No. ofbenefici-aires reached (scheme awareness): 25194 Food support (no. of meals): 97418 Safety kits: 0 Government subsidies mobilized (INR): 214500

USN	Type of NSA	Rural/ Urban/ Peri-Urban/ All	Entitlements	Beneficiary	Total Beneficiaries covered
NSA_38			Food: for homeless and migrants. Mostly cooked food and dry instant food packets Health and hygiene: safety kits provided to individuals all across the city and mostly people in bastis and migrants COVID Awareness: Awareness related to various entitlements during the pandemic as well as government, health and mobility guidelines and restrictions Government subsidies mobilized: Awareness and facilitating cash transfer as well as prioritizing beneficiaries	Urban poor from slum communities	No. of beneficiaires reached (COVID awareness): 32885 No. of beneficiaires reached (scheme awareness): 10795 Food support (no. of meals): 320550 Safety kits: 0 Government subsidies mobilized (INR): 76500
NSA_39	NGO	Urban + Rural	Medicines Dry ration kit (Oil, soap, dal, rice, turmeric, salt, sugar)	Women, children (special attention) and volunteers	2000 families
NSA_40	NGO	Urban	Sanitizers	volunteers	2000 individuals
NSA_41	NGO	Urban	Ration and soap	Volunteers	2100 individuals
NSA_42	NPO	Urban	Cooked meals Snacks Sanitizer Cash transfers	Individuals with no ration cards , daily wager , street vendor, homeless, domestic workers, ragpickers those who couldn't access govt schemes and had a kitchen	4000 individuals
NSA_43	Individual	Urban	Cash transfer	Individuals from bastis	5 individuals

USN	Type of NSA	Rural/ Urban/ Peri-Urban/ All	Entitlements	Beneficiary	Total Beneficiaries covered
NSA_44	NGO	Urban + Rural	Dry ration food kit (upto 50,000 calories - 5kg atta, 3kg rice, 3 kg daal, 1 kg oil, 1 sugar, 1kg salt) Santition kit (washing and bathing soap 2 pieces each)	No ration cards, Female run household, large number of children, HH whose main earning member is else, HH with no earning member, Disabled, widowed, association with SAATH programmes, immediate in need daily wage workers with no saving. (not necessarily migrant workers and was not considered as a mandatory category)	2500 kits

USN	Type of NSA	Rural/ Urban/ Peri-Urban/ All	Entitlements	Beneficiary	Total Beneficiaries covered
NSA_45	NGO		Dry ration food kit (upto 50,000 calories - 5kg atta, 3kg rice, 3 kg daal, 1 kg oil, 1 sugar, 1kg salt) Santition kit (washing and bathing soap 2 pieces each)	No ration cards, Female run household, large number of children, HH whose main earning member is else, HH with no earning member, Disabled, widowed, association with SAATH programmes, immediate in need daily wage workers with no saving. (not necessarily migrant workers and was not considered as a mandatory category)	250 kits

USN	Type of NSA	Rural/ Urban/ Peri-Urban/ All	Entitlements	Beneficiary	Total Beneficiaries covered
NSA_46	NGO		Dry ration food kit (upto 50,000 calories - 5kg atta, 3kg rice, 3 kg daal, 1 kg oil, 1 sugar, 1kg salt) Santition kit (washing and bathing soap 2 pieces each)	No ration cards, Female run household, large number of children, HH whose main earning member is else, HH with no earning member, Disabled, widowed, association with SAATH programmes, immediate in need daily wage workers with no saving. (not necessarily migrant workers and was not considered as a mandatory category)	150 kits

USN	Type of NSA	Rural/ Urban/ Peri-Urban/ All	Entitlements	Beneficiary	Total Beneficiaries covered
NSA_47	NGO		Dry ration food kit (upto 50,000 calories - 5kg atta, 3kg rice, 3 kg daal, 1 kg oil, 1 sugar, 1kg salt) Santition kit (washing and bathing soap 2 pieces each)	No ration cards, Female run household, large number of children, HH whose main earning member is else, HH with no earning member, Disabled, widowed, association with SAATH programmes, immediate in need daily wage workers with no saving. (not necessarily migrant workers and was not considered as a mandatory category)	200 kits

USN	Type of NSA	Rural/ Urban/ Peri-Urban/ All	Entitlements	Beneficiary	Total Beneficiaries covered
NSA_48	NGO		Dry ration food kit (upto 50,000 calories - 5kg atta, 3kg rice, 3 kg daal, 1 kg oil, 1 sugar, 1kg salt) Santition kit (washing and bathing soap 2 pieces each)	No ration cards, Female run household, large number of children, HH whose main earning member is else, HH with no earning member, Disabled, widowed, association with SAATH programmes, immediate in need daily wage workers with no saving. (not necessarily migrant workers and was not considered as a mandatory category)	1500 kits
NSA_49	NGO	Rural	large kits and smaller self mobilized kits (from travelling or returning migrants) + Sanitizers to all angawadi, police, gram panchayat and all other public places (foot based sanitizer)	Traveling migrants, individuals in public area, gram panchayat and police personell	10000 kits
NSA_50	Workers' Union	Urban	Ration kits (10kg rice, 10kg flour, 2kg oil, 1kg salt, sugar and other masalas)	Needy and vulnerable	650 kits
NSA_51	Workers' Union	Urban	Ration kits (10kg rice, 10kg flour, 2kg oil, 1kg salt, sugar and other masalas)	Needy and vulnerable	2000 kits
NSA_52	Workers' Union	Urban	Ration kits (10kg rice, 10kg flour, 2kg oil, 1kg salt, sugar and other masalas)	Needy and vulnerable	Not known

USN	Type of NSA	Rural/ Urban/ Peri-Urban/ All	Entitlements	Beneficiary	Total Beneficiaries covered
NSA_53	Workers' Union	Urban	Pressure for and facilitation of survey for State cash transfer scheme	All domestic workers registered with the union	Not known
NSA_54	Workers' Union	Urban	Facilitation of new bank accounts and ration cards	Those without ration cards and bank accounts in Jaipur	Not known
NSA_55	Workers' Union	Urban	Ration kits (10kg rice, 10kg flour, 2kg oil, 1kg salt, sugar and other masalas)	Single women HHs - old, widowed, separated women and registered with the union	Not known
NSA_56	Citizens Group	Urban	Cooked food -4 locations through community kitchens and packed food distributed at various points in the city where migrants were leaving such as inter city highways and bus terminals. Dry Ration Kits - composition 5 kg rice and atta, 2 kg pulses, 1 kg salt, 1 kg sugar, 1 lt oil, 1 soap, 250 gm chai, sanitary pads, and reusable masks.	Residents of 4 informal settlements facing food precarity, especially single men who lived near industrial areas, and migrants trying to leave the city.	2800 food packets a day distributed in April, May and June. 1000 food plates at 4 community kitchens in April, May, June, and July.
NSA_57	Activist collective with NGO support	Urban	Cooked food at community kitchen - 300 cooked meals distributed twice a day. 500 masks distributed to beneficiaries.	Residents of a large informal settlement neighboring an urban industrial area such as factory workers.	600 meals a day in April, May, June and July.

USN	Type of NSA	Rural/ Urban/ Peri-Urban/ All	Entitlements	Beneficiary	Total Beneficiaries covered
NSA_58	Activist Collective	Urban	Cooked food at 5 community kitchens across various locations in the city	Diverse group of beneficiaries in each location - daily wage workers, homeless populations, residents of informal and resettlement colonies.	Community Kitchen 1 - May, June and July - 150 meals morning and evening. Community Kitchen 2 - May, June and July - 150 meals morning and evening. Community Kitchen 3 - April, May and June - 100 meals morning and evening. Community Kitchen 4 - April, May and June - 100 meals once a day. Community Kitchen 5 - May and June 150 meals morning and evening.



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