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PANKAJA KULABKAR

The politics of implementing urban plans in India

The case of Pune's development plan

India has an elaborate system of urban planning, yet plans remain largely unimplemented. This is often attributed to 'politics', but the precise role played by politics has not been rigorously explored. This paper examines the political processes involved in the implementation of Pune's current development plan (1987–2007), and focuses on three proposals within this plan. It examines the reactions of the actors to the proposals, and analyses the impact of their responses on the implementation process. The central argument of this paper is that politics is not in a separate category from the other factors that influence implementation. Based on Grindle's (1980a) model of policy implementation, this study develops an analytical framework for analysing plan implementation in India. It uses data from documents and studies, newspaper clippings, in-depth semi-structured interviews and observation. It highlights the mismatch between the long-term nature of the development plan and the shorter tenures of municipal leaders. The evidence shows that, while commercial developers have considerable power over implementation, environmental groups and the media can be balancing forces. One of the outcomes of the tussle between these two sets of actors is delay in the plan's implementation.

Planning, politics and implementation

Over the years there has been a change in the concept of urban planning; rather than being seen as merely physical, planning has started to encompass social, economic and political concerns (Devas and Rakodi, 1993, 42). Moreover, while planning used to be thought of as a technical process, over the years it has increasingly come to be viewed as a political one (Allensworth, 1975; Bolan and Nuttall, 1975; Cherry, 1982; Cullingworth, 1973; Devas, 1993). Studies have

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discussed the roles of the many actors that are relevant to the planning process: planners, private businesses, commercial developers, bureaucrats, politicians, landowners and the military (Allensworth, 1975; Altschuler, 1965; Batley, 1993; Rabinovitz, 1969; Sarin, 1982).

Planners are said to enjoy both positive and negative powers. In positive terms, they design projects to be executed by the public sector; in negative terms, they have some control over development and redevelopment. Private business, on the other hand, is likely to support planning decisions that result in an increase in the number of business customers, or make business more accessible to customers. Commercial developers have a great deal of interest in the planning process, and are alleged to further their commercial interests at the cost of the community.

Studies mention several elements that influence the implementation process (Bardach, 1980; Cleaves, 1980; Grindle, 1980a; Majone and Wildavsky, 1984; Sabatier, 1986). The elements most commonly discussed in these studies are: clarity of goals, choice of implementation strategy, organisational context, compliance, interplay of actors and availability of resources.¹ This discussion was found to be relevant to the present study, which essentially is about the politics of implementation.

The present study perceives politics as a process in the public realm in which actors seek to further their respective interests. The author was in search of an analytical framework that is comprehensive, and at the same time enables an exploration of the political processes involved in implementation. Grindle's (1980a) model appeared to satisfy both these criteria. It perceives implementation as a political process, and takes into account most of the implementation elements that have been discussed in the literature. Moreover, Grindle's study is about developing countries, which made it all the more appropriate to the present study.

While researching models for the present study, the author came across two other models that are almost appropriate. These were devised by Bolan and Nuttall (1975) and Choguill (1994). However, while Bolan and Nuttall's work is about developed countries, Choguill's model is not so comprehensive. The author therefore chose Grindle's (1980a) model. However, Grindle's model concerns the politics of implementing urban policy, and the present study is about urban planning. Grindle's model therefore has been adapted to urban planning in India.

Analytical framework

The analytical framework developed by this study consists of three stages. The first concerns decisions that are related to the objectives and content of plans. Planners and those whose role it is to sanction plans are the decision makers. In India, the sanctioning authority is usually the respective state government.

¹ For discussion of the manner in which these elements influence the implementation process, see Kulabkar, 2000.

The second stage involves decisions that are related to the strategy of implementation. This includes the choice of implementing body, its roles, powers and functions, and its implementation strategies. During the third stage, the benefits (or otherwise) of plan implementation become apparent. Citizens may not respond adequately to the plan prior to its implementation because of insufficient information and reluctance to respond to remote outcomes. Once implementation begins and its impact becomes more tangible, citizens may start to respond. This stage may therefore be politically intense.

FIRST STAGE: PLAN FORMULATION

The following section will discuss the various ways in which decisions regarding the contents of the plan influence the implementation process in the Indian context.

Types of benefits

Plan proposals differ in terms of the benefits that they offer. While some offer collective benefits, others offer divisible benefits. Since collective benefits accrue to people in the neighbourhood as a whole, the implementing body is likely to get the collective support of this neighbourhood and there will be a chance for the proposal to be implemented as envisaged in the plan. However, it is important that people are aware of government initiatives, perceive them as benefits, and are willing to invest their resources to support them. In the context of developing countries, levels of citizen awareness depend on literacy rates and the dissemination of information by government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the media. Divisible benefits like housing, on the other hand, accrue to individual members of the community, and may lead to conflict and competition between individuals. As a result of these conflicts, the implementation process may take a direction that is very different from what was originally envisaged. It might be noted that divisible benefits require more than one actor in the field.

Range of objectives

The range or time scale of the plan may affect the implementation process. While the tenure of a development plan is usually 20 years, the tenure of councillors is normally five years, and that of the municipal commissioner (the head of the executive) is three years. This implies that there are no leaders in the municipal body who are properly accountable for the implementation of the plan, and that the leaders do not make political gain unless action programmes are drawn up for shorter periods of time. A municipal body may therefore be not very interested in implementing a development plan. However, there might be exceptions, particularly with plan proposals that have short time spans.

Clarity of goals

Clarity in a plan's goals facilitates a municipal body in designing projects to implement them. While clarity may reduce differences in the interpretation of goals, it does not necessarily remove these differences. The interests of the actors involved in the planning process may influence these differing interpretations.

Even where the goals are clearly stated, parties may still go to court in seeking to influence the municipal body to adopt their interpretation. Problems in interpreting a proposal's objectives may stand in the way of initiating implementation of the plan proposal.

Realism of goals

Planners in India appear to be divided on which aspects need to be considered when designing a plan's goals. For some planners, the foremost concern is the ability of the municipal body to fulfil the plan's goals. According to this view, to prevent a mismatch between goals and the capacity of the municipal body, planners ought to consider seriously the financial resources of the municipal body. The other view is that planners need to give precedence to the present and future needs of the citizens rather than the resources of the municipal body. According to this view, if the planners do not reserve adequate land for future needs, the municipal body will never be able to find the required land even if it does find the resources to acquire and develop it.

SECOND STAGE: STRATEGY OF IMPLEMENTATION

Decisions taken at this stage are expected to influence the implementation process in the following ways.

Resources invested

Availability of the following resources might influence a municipal body in deciding whether to implement a particular plan proposal: finances, land, skills, time, information and the enthusiasm of the leadership. However, the availability of resources may not necessarily be a reason for failing to initiate the implementation of a proposal. Resource unavailability may be used to disguise the political unacceptability of a proposal. Municipal bodies are very dependent on their respective state governments for the skills and finance required for urban planning. This gives state governments considerable leverage in implementing urban plans.

Characteristics of the project

Once the decision to implement a plan proposal has been taken and a project to implement it has been designed, the nature of the project can affect the implementation process in the following ways:

- the level of participation of the various actors within and outside the implementing body;
- the nature of the political activity undertaken by these actors;
- the time span of the project; and
- the number of organisations involved in implementing the project—coordination might be necessary if more than one organisation is involved.

The implementation of a project also depends on whether its crucial elements have been worked out systematically. This depends on the willingness and ability of the implementing body to work out these details.

THIRD STAGE

Issues that can influence decisions taken during this stage are discussed below.

Actors: power, interests and strategies

Actors, in this study, are individuals or bodies involved in the implementation process. They seek to protect and further their interests during the implementation process. These interests may range from self-interest to altruism, such as the desire to improve a city's environment. Actors may seek to influence the process to further these interests, and their ability to do this depends on their power, which in turn is likely to depend on the resources they possess and their willingness to use them for political purposes. They need to employ resources in an effective manner to reach their respective objectives. In other words, they need to use an appropriate strategy to fulfil their goals. The following actors are to be expected in the context of implementing urban plans in India:

- planners, who are different from development control officers;
- municipal bodies, including politicians and bureaucratic staff. Municipal bodies might not be homogeneous;
- state governments, which too may not be homogeneous. Because city planning is often beyond its jurisdiction, the central government will probably not qualify as an actor;
- politicians (other than those at the municipal and the state level, included in the previous two categories);
- landowners;
- commercial developers;
- beneficiaries, as perceived by the plan;
- citizens, who may not be the direct beneficiaries of the proposal. It is likely that there will be differences between citizens, and therefore citizens as actors might not be homogeneous;
- NGOs and professional organisations (chambers of commerce, associations of architects, associations of engineers);
- the media; and
- the judiciary.

Institutional characteristics

This refers to the characteristics of the bodies involved in the implementation and the overall political system. Implementation is likely to be influenced by the organisational structure of the municipal body and the level of cooperation between its political and bureaucratic wings. Relationships between the state government and the municipal body also affect implementation, as does relevant planning legislation. Legislative provisions can help these institutions to play the roles that they wish to play in implementation. The level of openness in the political system is also relevant here, because it influences how well information is disseminated to the actors, and whether their participation is encouraged.

Compliance and responsiveness

For a proposal to be implemented, the compliance of the political and bureaucratic wings of the municipal body is required. In addition, a municipal body needs to have the support of the state government, politicians at the local and the state level, beneficiaries, and other urban actors, depending on the nature of the proposal. This support may be achieved through one (or a combination) of the following: persuasion, negotiation, bargaining, the use of intermediaries, the use of a body's reputation, patronage, threats, and the release of a minimum amount of information to the public. The use of compliance measures by a municipal body is conditioned by its resources, and by the level of resistance to the plan. While the municipal body might resort to these measures to ensure the compliance of the actors concerned, actors who are not happy with the proposal might simultaneously seek to subvert the process. The consequence can be a stalemate as far as the implementation of the plan is concerned.

For a plan proposal to enjoy support from its beneficiaries, the municipal body must encourage the participation of citizens in its design and implementation, and be responsive to their needs. In principle, Indian planning legislation encourages the participation of citizens by making it obligatory for the municipal body to invite objections from the public. However, there have been complaints from NGOs that municipal bodies avoid this requirement by failing to circulate information about the planning process widely enough.

Pune

In 1991, the population of Pune was around 2.5 million (MASHAL, 1996, 24). This city has a rich history. It was the capital of the Maratha rulers during the eighteenth century, and the second capital of the Bombay Presidency under the British. It lies around 115 miles south-east of Mumbai, the capital of Maharashtra. Situated at an altitude of 1,500 feet above sea level, near the Sahyadri mountain range which lies between Mumbai and Pune, it is known for its health-giving climate (PMC, undated; PMC, unpublished). However, in recent years an increase in traffic has led to high levels of pollution and a large number of accidents.

Pune has grown at a rate of 2.2 per cent to 3.5 per cent per annum during the last four decades (MASHAL, 1996, 24). The growing population of the city has put increasing pressure on the land. Land prices have risen, leading to a severe shortage of affordable new rental accommodation. Moreover, over 10,000 dilapidated houses need to be replaced (MASHAL, 1996, 61).

The unavailability of affordable accommodation for those in the lower income bracket has resulted in a rapid increase in slums. As much as 40 per cent of Pune's population live in slums (MASHAL, 1996, 63). In the Indian context, slums are interpreted as those areas in which people live in unhygienic conditions. Although people do live in such areas, the municipal body is not under any obligation to provide basic services to these sites unless they are declared as slums under the relevant legislation. It is common, therefore, for

people living in such areas to encourage the municipal body to declare their neighbourhoods slums.

The development plan

Pune currently has a 20-year plan, which expires in 2007. It was prepared in accordance with the *Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act* (MRTP) of 1966. According to the MRTP, municipal bodies in Maharashtra must prepare plans for the areas under their jurisdiction at a regular interval of 20 years; they must also implement them. However, in reality the state government usually formulates the plans, because municipal bodies do not have the requisite skills. The present plan for Pune was prepared by the Directorate of Town Planning (DTP), the planning wing of the state government. The process of preparing the plan began in 1976. In 1982, the draft plan was published and objections were invited from the public. In 1984, the DTP submitted the plan to the state government for approval after taking public feedback into consideration. The state government sanctioned the plan in 1987, and the plan came into effect the same year. It therefore took a decade for the plan to be prepared and approved.

A key feature of this plan involves reserved sites. In the Indian context, reserved sites are those that are set aside by planners for public uses, such as hospitals and children's playgrounds. Construction on these sites other than for the purposes specified in the plan is not allowed, nor can they be purchased or sold. In Pune, planners reserved 0.24 hectares per 1,000 people for recreation. In doing so, they took advantage of the hills with which the city is blessed. They saw these as the lungs of the city, and as a rich source of recreational facilities for its citizens. All the hills were therefore reserved as open areas, and no construction was permitted on them (Keskar, 1999). The other two significant features of the plan are as follows.

- Slum improvement. The plan conveyed concern about the growing slums. It expressed the need to move certain slums, such as those that were near water supply sources and those that were causing hygiene and health problems for other people in the city. The rest of the slums were to be improved on their existing sites.
- Low-income sectors. The draft plan assumed that if those in the lower income bracket could be given affordable housing, they would not encroach on reserved lands. It therefore reserved 500 hectares for housing the urban poor. However, while sanctioning the plan the state government deleted several of the sites reserved for this purpose on the grounds that it was beyond the means of the Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC) to implement this many reservations. (Keskar, 1999)

The PMC is the plan's implementation body, and has two wings (executive and legislative). The executive wing is headed by the municipal commissioner (henceforth referred to as the commissioner), who normally enjoys a term of three years. However, quite often commissioners have been transferred before

their term has been completed.² The legislative wing consists of 129 members whose term lasts for five years (PMC, 2001). This means that although the plan covers 20 years, the tenures of the politicians and bureaucrats responsible for implementing it range from three to five years. The outcome is that no single individual in the PMC can be held responsible for the plan's implementation.

Implementing the plan

One concerned PMC officer told the author in 1999 that, 'unfortunately', the PMC had not evaluated the plan's implementation. This may sound strange, as the review exercise is not very complicated and a municipal body that caters to a population of 2.5 million must be able to undertake it. One possible explanation is that although the review process is simple, the PMC did not feel the need to undertake it. The PMC was not asked to report on the plan's implementation to the state government, to the public or to any other body. The MRTTP requires the municipal body to review the plan at least once in 20 years. The PMC therefore tends to review the plan at the end of its 20-year term (to meet the statutory requirement) when it is time for revision.

Articles have given rough estimates about details of the implementation without properly explaining how these figures were arrived at, and without seeking to elaborate on the plan's performance. According to one estimate, since the plan came into effect only around 8–10 per cent of the sites reserved in the plan actually have been created (Sardesai, 1989). According to another estimate, during the five-year period between 1987–1991 the PMC had been able to acquire only 5 per cent of the total reservations (Paranjape, 1991).

The delay in preparing Pune's development plan, and its poor implementation, are not unusual in the Indian context. More than 600 development plans have been prepared in the past three decades. The performance of these plans has been poor. Paranjape argues that this has been largely due to 'connivance' on the part of staff in municipal bodies, the absence of rigour in the exercise of development control regulations, and inadequate resources (Paranjape, 1991).

Methodology

The techniques of data collection used in this study were literature review, semi-structured interviews and observation. Literature in the fields of implementation, urban planning and urban politics was reviewed.³ The semi-structured interview was used because it enabled the researcher to clarify certain points, remove misunderstandings and follow up interesting responses. A total of 114

2 Since 1994, the PMC has had about four commissioners. The shortest tenure was probably that of Arun Bhatia, who received his marching orders from the state government within six days of assuming office, was reinstated under public pressure, and left again in less than three months when he lost a no-confidence motion in the PMC's General Assembly (*Indian Express*, 20 June 1999).

3 For a discussion of the literature in these fields, see Kulabkar, 2000.

key informants were interviewed, mainly in Pune, Mumbai and Delhi. They included planners, NGO staff, commercial developers, citizens, politicians, bureaucrats, academics, media workers, architects, engineers, landowners, bank employees and industrialists. When selecting these informants, an attempt was made to include those involved with preparing, sanctioning and implementing the plan. The fieldwork was carried out largely during 1998 and 1999.

Implementing the three plan proposals

Parvati, survey area number 44 and the hills were among the few reservations that the PMC considered while implementing the plan. Moreover, it appeared to the author that the implementation of these three proposals had had a big impact on Pune's residents. I therefore did not expect the reconstruction of events related to these proposals to be difficult. Public resistance and changes in decisions occurred during the implementation of all three proposals, giving me the opportunity to study the politics involved. This made them appropriate to the present study, which is primarily interested in the role of politics in implementing urban plans.

PARVATI HILL

The site that is probably most closely associated with the evolution of Pune, and its beauty, is Parvati Hill. This site is associated with the Peshwas, the Maratha rulers during the eighteenth century. The Peshwas constructed the main Hindu shrine on Parvati Hill in 1749 (Gadgil, 1945, 15). Apart from the historical and emotional significance of this site for the citizens of Pune, its central location and easy accessibility has made it a favourite recreation spot. One of its special features is the Mutha River Right Bank Canal, which runs across it. An open canal until very recently, it is the main source of water for the city. For all of these reasons, land in this neighbourhood is expensive.

Over the years, settlements have grown on Parvati Hill, and today they cover almost one-third of it. The number of these settlements increased during the 1970s, when drought hit Maharashtra and people migrated from the villages and found refuge in the cities (Bapat, 1987, 6; Bapat, 1988, 799). Aside from these migrants, those who have settled in Parvati Hill previously lived in the inner areas of Pune. Their housing tenements became run-down over the years, and because they were not able to afford alternative accommodation, they settled on Parvati Hill. These settlers include retired military personnel who gave up their official residences on retirement (Bapat, 1988, 799).

The settlement on the upper slopes of Parvati Hill is known as Janata Vasahat, and is inhabited by those who are relatively better-off than those who have settled on the lower slopes (Bapat, 1987, 8; Bapat, 1988, 799). Those who live on the lower slopes mostly work as rag-pickers, road-sweepers and porters. The incomes of around 80 per cent of the settlers on Parvati Hill during the 1980s were below the subsistence level. Forty per cent of these settlers worked at home, near the settlement or in the inner city (Bapat, 1987, 6; Bapat, 1988, 799). The citizens of Pune strongly dislike these eyesores on their beloved hill. The

draft plan clearly stated that Parvati Hill ought to be cleared of the slums, and that the site ought to be reserved as a park. The commissioner at the time was keen to implement this recommendation, and decided to take the initiative in implementing the proposal before the draft plan had even been approved. This is surprising given the poor record of the PMC in implementing reservations, and goes to show how the preferences of the municipal leadership can affect a plan's implementation. The commissioner had the chief minister's support. The same party was in power at both state and municipal levels, and this also proved to be helpful.

The implementation of the Parvati project began in 1984 amid great enthusiasm. Its aim was to move the slums from Parvati Hill to Bibwewadi and Dhankavdi, two sites that were (then) near the southern periphery of Pune (Bapat, 1988, 797). These sites were selected by the PMC from those that had been reserved under the plan for the lower-income groups. Residents were offered constructed tenements. According to Bapat (1988, 799), initially it was decided that loans at a rate of 12 per cent per annum would be made available to the residents. However, the PMC lowered this to 8 per cent (with a 15-year repayment period) when an article in a newspaper pointed out that the Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) offered loans to statutory bodies at a much lower rate, and that the slum-dwellers of Parvati Hill were entitled to this provision (Bapat, 1988, 799).

The PMC justified the Parvati project on several grounds. It claimed that the slums polluted the canal, and that moving them would solve the problem of water pollution in Pune. The project was also expected to benefit Parvati Hill residents, as they lived in unhygienic conditions. The new tenements at the periphery of the city promised them better living conditions and legalised tenure. The project was also in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on Shelter⁴ regarding providing slum residents with housing rights (Sunderam and Bongirwar, 1985, 263).

Bapat (1987, 14), an academic who opposed the project, countered these arguments. She argued that the canal was already polluted at the point at which it entered the city, and that evicting slum dwellers from Parvati Hill would not stop water pollution. Parvati Hill residents lived in better conditions than people in several other slums in the city, and relocating them on unhygienic grounds was therefore not justified. Moreover, the task force had clearly recommended providing slum-dwellers with the right to live on existing sites. By relocating slums, the project violated this recommendation. Bapat asserted that the developers had put pressure on the PMC to remove the slums from the site. The local neighbourhood has high land values, and the developers feared that the slums would make the neighbourhood less attractive.

Many residents of Parvati Hill opposed the project from the very beginning. Relocation meant that they would lose their existing settlement. Several

4 The Indian government had appointed this task force, of which Bapat was a member, to study the problem of slums in the country. Its report was published in 1983.

residents worked near Parvati Hill, and relocation would result in longer commuting distances and additional expenditure. Most of the residents were in the lower income bracket, and they associated the relocation project with hardship.

These opposing residents formed a committee, which petitioned the state government and the PMC. It had the support of an academic who arranged for free legal advice from an eminent lawyer, enabling it to file a writ petition in the High Court against the project. In their petition, the residents questioned the rationale of the project. They also mentioned that since the PMC claimed that relocation under the project was voluntary, it should provide basic amenities for those who remained on the existing site. The PMC argued in its affidavit that since a majority of the residents were in favour of the project, there was no need to provide services for those who chose to remain on the site. The court, much to the disappointment of the residents, supported the PMC's argument and dismissed the petition.

A few councillors who were unhappy with the PMC's choice of contractors for constructing the new tenements supported the rebelling residents. One of the councillors owned part of Parvati Hill. He had proposed moving the residents to a piece of land that he owned close to the site. He had also expressed his willingness to construct new tenements for the residents. However, the PMC did not consider his suggestions. The piqued councillor sympathised with the rebelling residents.

The project continued despite the opposition from many residents, and rapid progress was made during the initial months. However, administrative and financial problems soon arose. Many settlers refused to move from the hill. Some of those who had moved out returned to the site, and invited their relatives and friends to join them. In addition, the PMC faced losses: those residents who had been relocated to the new tenements did not pay the development charges that were levied upon them as regularly as had been expected. Matters worsened with the transfer of the commissioner, who had been instrumental in designing and implementing the project. In 1987, the PMC called off the project (Bapat, 1987; Bapat, 1988; CDSA, undated; Shaikh, 1987). The shanty towns of Parvati Hill are still there (Ghosh, 1999; Peshwa, 1999). One of the residents, who had opposed the project and was a member of the committee, is now the local councillor. This is his second term in office, and he continues to live in a shanty on Parvati Hill.

Analysis

In reserving Parvati Hill as a park and recommending the clearing of slums, planners promised Pune's citizens a cleaner environment and better access to the site. In other words, the proposal offered collective benefits, and it is not surprising that there was very little opposition from most of the citizens or from the media. The commissioner's enthusiasm in implementing the proposal was instrumental. This case demonstrates the impetus that a commissioner can bring to a plan, and confirms Pyle's (1980, 143) assertion about how variations in the powers of individuals within organisations can affect implementation.

The commissioner seems to have assumed that the project was realistic. It is not known whether he had anticipated the opposition and the resulting delay, or whether he realised that the project could not be completed within his term of office. Certain institutional characteristics—specifically, that the political party which controlled the state government was also in power at the municipal level—helped the project.

The next commissioner did not share his predecessor's enthusiasm for the Parvati Hill project, and this appears to have been reflected in the resources that were invested in it. Other factors that impeded its success included the absence of any compensation or incentives for Parvati Hill residents, and a low level of responsiveness to their needs.

Apart from the commissioner, the actors who played a significant role in this case included Parvati Hill residents, the landowner, local councillors, the state government and the activists who opposed the Parvati project. Since the landowner was also the local councillor, he might have anticipated losing vote banks if the slums were removed from the existing site. The powers, interests and strategies of these actors are summarised in Table 1. In spite of the clarity of their goals, some of these actors differed in their interpretations of the Parvati project. Their respective interests seem to have influenced their positions.

SURVEY AREA NUMBER 44

This site lies on a range of hills in Pune. The 1982 draft plan reserved the area, which is a prime locality in Pune, as green-belt land. In spite of this, a developer purchased the land from the owner, a public trust. Critics alleged that he had entered into the transaction despite being aware of the reservation, and had got the land at a very low price (Citizens, 1990; *Kesari*, 1990; Mali, 1994; *Sakal*, 1990). In purchasing the land despite its reservation status, he demonstrated his confident belief that the land would be de-reserved.

After taking possession of the land, the developer proposed de-reservation to the PMC. He also requested permission to construct luxurious commercial residential apartments on the site (Citizens, 1990), and began to mobilise support among councillors and PMC bureaucrats, as well as those in power in the state government. There were indications that he had been successful in his efforts. In 1982 the PMC moved a proposal to de-reserve the site, and the state government recommended this course of action in 1984 (Kesar, 1984; *Loksatta*, 1990; Mali, 1994). In November 1988, the state government even sent a directive to the PMC recommending that the reservation be de-reserved.

Although these de-reservation attempts began in 1982, they only caught the attention of a few newspapers (*Maharashtra Herald*, *Indian Express*, *Kesari* and *Sakal*) when the state government sent its directive to the PMC in 1988. These reports inspired some NGOs (including Save Poona Committee, Vanarai, Social Civic and Environmental Forum and Lokavidnyan Sanghatana) to oppose the proposal. These NGOs are concerned mainly with environmental issues and their staff members are academics, lawyers and wildlife experts. By 1990, they had become experienced in opposing and stalling PMC actions (like construction on Hanuman Hill, and the building of a 100-foot road in the survey area

Table 1 *Summary of findings*

<i>Stages</i>	<i>Parvati</i>	<i>Survey area number 44</i>	<i>Hill slopes</i>
<i>First stage: plan formulation</i>			
Type of benefits	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● CB offered by proposal helped PMC to mobilise support of media and citizens 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● CB offered by original proposal helped NGOs and media to mobilise citizens after threatened modification ● 'Individual benefits' rather than 'divisible benefits' are relevant here 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● CB offered by original proposal helped NGOs and media to mobilise citizens only after original proposal was threatened by modification
Range of objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Commissioner assumed goal could be achieved within short period of time 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● LTN of original proposal discouraged PMC from implementing it, while STN of modification procedure and implementation of modified proposal appealed to PMC ● STN of modification inspired NGOs and media to campaign against its implementation, while LTN of original proposal discouraged NGOs and media from campaigning for its implementation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● LTN of original proposal discouraged PMC from implementing it, while STN of modification procedure and implementation of modified proposal appealed to PMC ● LTN of original proposal discouraged NGOs and media from campaigning for its implementation prior to modification threats ● State government's proposal would place short-term obligations on PMC, so PMC resisted it
Clarity of goals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● In spite of clarity of goals the actors interpreted them differently 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● In spite of clarity of goals the actors interpreted them differently 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Not significant
Realism of goals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Commissioner considered goals to be realistic and initiated implementation despite obvious difficulties involved 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● PMC considered goals unrealistic (challenged by NGOs) but no assessment of alternative methods of implementation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● PMC considered goals unrealistic (challenged by NGOs) but no assessment of alternative methods of implementation
<i>Second stage: strategies to implement</i>			
Resources invested	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● PMC's investment in project varied with municipal commissioners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● PMC's leadership reluctant to implement proposal and did not invest any resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● PMC's leadership reluctant to implement proposal and did not invest any resources
Characteristics of project	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● No compensation/incentives for Hill residents and their participation in project was inadequate ● CB helped PMC to mobilise support of media and citizens 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Modification attempt stalled and original proposal is yet to be implemented. Characteristics of project therefore irrelevant 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● One modification attempt stalled; another was successful but has not yet been implemented. Characteristics of project therefore irrelevant

Table 1 *Summary of findings (continued)*

<i>Stages</i>	<i>Parvati</i>	<i>Survey area number 44</i>	<i>Hill slopes</i>
<i>Third stage: implementation</i>			
Actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> commissioners, state government, Hill residents, landowner, councillors, activists 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> developer, PMC, central government, state government, NGOs, media 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> developers, PMC, state government, landlords, NGOs, media
Power	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> commissioner: executive head of PMC state government: control over PMC Hill residents: large numbers and sustained opposition landowner: close contact with Hill residents and power over them councillors: patronage activists: reputation, contacts and writing skills 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> developer: monetary strength, contacts PMC: power to initiate modification and vote on proposal state government: powers over PMC and plan implementation NGOs: reputation media: reputation, power to reach large numbers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> developers: monetary strength, contacts PMC: power to initiate modifications and vote on proposal state government: power over PMC and plan implementation landlords and developers: monetary strength NGOs: reputation media: reputation, power to reach large numbers
Interests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> commissioner: ambition to design and successfully implement the project state government: no particular interest Hill residents: survival on Hill at stake landowner: loses vote banks if slums removed councillors: lose vote banks if slums removed activists: professional interest in slums 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> developer: modification allows him to construct on site PMC: avoids implementation of original proposal, allegedly benefits from favours offered by developer state government: some members tempted by favours allegedly offered by developer NGOs and media: protect hills of Pune 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> landlords and developers: expected to benefit financially from modification PMC: wishes to escape implementing original proposal. Successfully lobbied by developers and landowners, wary of opposition from media state government: successfully lobbied by developers and landlords. Allegedly some ministers own hills in Pune NGOs and media: protect Pune's environment
Strategies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> commissioner: mobilised support of state government and public state government: mobilised support of PMC Hill residents: tried to lobby councillors, state government, activists, judiciary landowner and councillors: supported Hill residents opposing the project activists: sought to mobilise public through articles and arranged legal advice for residents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> developer: mobilised PMC and state government PMC: mobilised support within PMC and state government, released minimum information to public state government: supported modification, saying it was PMC's will and withdrew when opposition became strong NGOs and media: mobilised central government, citizens, PMC and state government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> landlords and developers: mobilised PMC and state government PMC: mobilised support within PMC and state government state government: invoked MRTP and gave minimum information to public NGOs and media: mobilised citizens, PMC and state government

Table 1 *Summary of findings (continued)*

<i>Stages</i>	<i>Parvati</i>	<i>Survey area number 44</i>	<i>Hill slopes</i>
<i>Third stage: implementation</i>			
Institutional characteristics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● CM influenced party councillors in PMC to support project. This was facilitated because the same political party was in power in the state government and in the PMC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Both wings of PMC agreed on modifying proposal ● central government influenced state government to withdraw modification. This was facilitated because the same party controlled the central and state governments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Both wings of PMC agreed to oppose state government's modification ● state government invoked MRTTP to enable it to intervene. Gave minimum information about modification to public
Compliance and responsiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● PMC had state government's support for the project ● poor compliance of a few PMC officers with project regulations, poor responsiveness to needs of Hill residents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Modification procedure facilitated by majority of PMC councillors complying with party directives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● PMC responsive to NGO's objection to modification and resisted state government's directive

key: CB = collective benefits; LTN = long-term nature; STN = short-term nature; CM = chief minister

under discussion in this section), which they perceived as endangering the city's environment. In the case of the road, they successfully sought the intervention of the then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi.

The NGOs began to collect signatures on petitions, and held press conferences, public rallies and workshops to inform the public and mobilise opposition. They were joined by the Express Citizens Forum, organised by the Pune edition of an English-language daily newspaper, the *Indian Express*. The convenor of this forum is the editor of the Pune edition of the newspaper, and its membership includes environmentalists, academics, planners, artists, filmmakers, industrialists and retired senior bureaucrats. The convenors of several of the NGOs mentioned earlier are members of this forum. The *Indian Express* gave space to the arguments both for and against the reservation, and covered the NGOs' activities. An alliance between the NGOs and the media therefore facilitated the mobilisation of public opinion.

The NGOs' major objection was that the developer's proposal would limit the general public's access to the site, and inspire other developers to attempt similar projects on Pune's other hills. The state government and the PMC were accused of helping the developer to make large profits at the cost of the city's environment. The developer argued that he was willing to plant trees in one section of the site, meaning that the residential construction would not harm the city's environment.

Just as the developer had mobilised support in the state government and the PMC, the local protestors lobbied these institutions by sending representatives and petitions.⁵ The NGOs also wrote to the Prime Minister and a few central ministries.⁶ This is noteworthy because planning in Pune is clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the central government. A flurry of activity took place prior to 28 March 1990, when the proposal was voted upon in the PMC's General Assembly. Political parties held meetings to discuss their respective stances. There were differences of opinion within parties; this was the case with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Newspapers reported that two broad views had emerged during party discussions. One group was reluctant to support the proposal because it was not in the interests of the citizens. The other group argued that the party ought to support it for the sake of the developer, who had helped the party in the past. Eventually, most party members voted in favour of the proposal.

5 Petitions were sent to the Chief Minister, the Leader of the Opposition in the State Assembly, the Minister of Urban Development in the Government of Maharashtra, the Minister of the Environment and Forests in the Government of Maharashtra, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, Lok Ayukta (the Divisional Commissioner for Pune), the Municipal Commissioner for Pune, the Urban Land Ceiling Department (Pune), and the Charity Commissioner (Citizens, 1990).

6 Petitions were sent to the Finance Minister, the Minister of State for the Environment and the Minister for Urban Development.

7 The Ministry of Environment and Forests told one of the NGO convenors that the ministry had asked the state government to submit a report on the matter. In this report, the state government pointed out that the PMC had decided to de-reserve the site because of the expense involved in acquiring and developing the site as a park (30 million rupees). After considering the

Meanwhile, the central government had responded favourably to the NGO petitions.⁷ Before the vote on 28 March, the NGOs published an announcement in the newspapers thanking the central government for its interest in the matter and applauding the few councillors who had opposed the proposal. They appealed to councillors from all parties to oppose the move and asked the citizens to assemble in large numbers at the PMC on the day of the vote (Citizens, 1990).

Heated discussions took place during the PMC discussion, and allegations were exchanged. Councillors who supported the de-reservation were accused of receiving money from the developer, and he in turn was accused of 'buying' the councillors and officials. The vote, however, went in favour of the proposal.

The proposal was then sent to the state government for approval. However, in an interesting turn of events, the state government refused to sanction it. This appears to have persuaded the state government to change its mind; the site's reservation status is still intact.

Ten years have now passed, and the PMC has yet to take any steps towards implementing the original proposal. The NGOs that were active in the campaign have moved on to other issues. The number of slums on the site has increased over the years. An NGO convenor told the author that, in one way, the NGOs had failed: while they had succeeded in stopping the construction plan, they had failed to get the original proposal implemented. He added that many local residents who had previously supported the NGOs now blamed them for the number of slums on the site. They argued that if the NGOs had allowed the developer to go ahead with the construction of residential apartments, there would not have been so many slums.

Analysis

As in the case of Parvati Hill, the original green-belt proposal for the site offered collective benefits to the citizens, which enabled the NGOs and the media to mobilise opposition to the developer's proposal. This case does not provide an opportunity to study the impact of divisible benefits. Since only one developer was involved, benefits may be said to be individual rather than divisible. Unlike Parvati Hill, the PMC did not consider the green-belt proposal to be realistic, and was reluctant to invest resources in implementing it. Because the proposal was not implemented, the characteristics of the project are not relevant to this study.

The proposal remained unimplemented for several years, and this might be attributed to its long-term nature. This also explains why the NGOs and the media did not put pressure on the PMC to implement it until the PMC decided to modify it. Preventing the modification of the proposal seems to have appeared to be a less time-consuming process to the NGOs and the media.

The key actors in this case were the developer, the PMC, the state govern-

matter, the ministry advised the state government to maintain the reservation. It told the state government that if this was beyond its capacity, then it should maintain the site as green-belt land or as an open space.

ment, NGOs and the media. Additionally, the central government unexpectedly emerged as a significant actor. The powers, interests and strategies of these actors have been summarised in Table 1. There was heterogeneity within the PMC: one similarity with Parvati Hill is that despite the clarity of their goals, there were differences between the actors regarding the proposal. The institutional characteristics had a mixed influence on the implementation process. While, on the one hand, the modification procedures were facilitated by the fact that both the wings of the PMC agreed to alter the proposal, the central government's lack of support convinced the state government to refuse to sanction the modification. The overall compliance of the councillors with party directives facilitated the passage of the modification proposal.

HILLS

There are many hills in Pune, covering roughly 915 hectares of land within the PMC's jurisdiction. Around 41 per cent of this area is privately owned (Kardaley, 1998; MASHAL, 1996, 89). Because the planners reserved the hills for recreation and afforestation, neither construction nor any transactions can take place there. This means that the landowners stand to lose from the planners' recommendations, and they have repeatedly asked the PMC and the state government to de-reserve the land. This mobilisation proved fruitful. In 1993, the PMC claimed that it did not have the funds to acquire the hills, nor did it have the capacity to prevent slums from encroaching upon them. The PMC proposed to the state government that construction for recreational purposes should be allowed on the hills, provided that it did not exceed 4 per cent on the 'floor space index' (the ratio of the combined gross floor-space to the total area of the plot). This would result in swimming pools, sports and games centres, health clubs, a cafeteria, canteens and amusement parks. The state government approved the proposal on 5 June 1997, four years after receiving it, but it soon revised its decision. Just three weeks later, the state government directed the PMC to permit as much as 20 per cent construction upon the hills for residential purposes. The PMC had to publish a notification inviting citizens' views on the subject (under Section 37 of the MRTP) within 60 days of the directive being issued. The commissioner of the PMC was reported to have opposed this directive (*Indian Express*, 1998b). On observing the PMC's delay in implementing the directive, the state government invoked Section 37(1A) of the MRTP and published the notification itself.

The decision to permit 20 per cent residential construction was vehemently opposed by various NGOs (ECONET, Parisar, Social Civic and Environmental Forum, Vanarai, etc.). They argued that permitting such a high percentage of construction upon the hills amounted to violating the recommendations of the planners. Moreover, it furthered the interests of developers and landowners at the cost of the city's environment. The NGOs also resented the manner in which the state government had proposed an increased amount of construction on the hills. Although it was such a vital issue, the state government had not thought it necessary to consult the citizens. Instead, it invited objections from the public without explaining why it had proposed the increase. A newspaper reported that an advocate for the state government had stated that the government did not

have to give such clarification, because 'we will not be able to run the government if we do so' (*Indian Express*, 1998a).

As in survey area number 44, NGOs lobbied the PMC and the citizens. They wrote articles in newspapers, held workshops to inform people about the repercussions of construction, and encouraged people to file objections. The NGO-media partnership also reappeared, and NGOs again took the state government to court. However, the court dismissed the petition on the grounds that it was premature, and the state government subsequently withdrew its 20 per cent recommendation. The government had seen the strength of NGO and media opposition in cases such as survey area number 44. This probably influenced the decision to withdraw its support from the proposal. Another possible factor was the Prabhat Road case, for which the state government had received bad publicity; the media had exposed how the government had successfully de-reserved a school site in a prime locality in Pune, so that it could be developed for commercial purposes by the Chief Minister's son-in-law.

Analysis

As in Parvati and survey area number 44, the original proposal in this case offered collective benefits to the citizens. In spite of this, again as in survey area number 44, NGOs and the media mobilised public opposition after the proposal was challenged by a modification. The long-term nature of the proposal appears to have influenced the public's response, and that of the PMC in not implementing the proposal. Interestingly, the PMC strongly resisted the state government's attempt to allow 20 per cent construction on the hills. The PMC may have imagined that it would be expected to implement the 20 per cent construction with the same speed, and given that this was a demanding proposition, the PMC was quick to state that it did not support the modification.

As in survey area number 44, the PMC had not considered the original proposal to be realistic, and did not appear to be interested in investing any resources in its implementation. Because the altered (4 per cent) proposal has yet to be implemented, the characteristics of the project are not relevant in this case. Actors who played prominent roles in this case include developers, the PMC, the state government, landlords, NGOs and the media. Their powers, interests and strategies are summarised in Table 1. Two institutional characteristics played a significant role: the state government provided only minimal information to the public when invoking the MRTP provisions for a speedy implementation of its proposed modification, and both wings of the PMC agreed to oppose the state government's proposed modification. The PMC's responsiveness to the NGOs' objections contributed to the stalling of the modification.

Findings and contributions

The analytical framework described above was useful when analysing the three cases, although there was no opportunity to test divisible benefits. This framework may be used to analyse other development plans in India, and

perhaps elsewhere, but it requires some adaptation. First, in the hills, the response of the NGOs to the proposed modifications was found to be influenced by the 'extent of change' that the modifications were expected to bring to the environment. The 'extent of change' therefore needs to be accommodated in the framework. Second, the second stage of the framework interpreted 'implementation' to mean 'designing projects for implementing the plan'. This limited interpretation excludes the modification of proposals, which occurred in two of the three cases. This also needs to be incorporated in the framework.

Existing literature on planning in India tends to see plan implementation as having two possible outcomes: successful implementation or failure (the plan never gets beyond the on-paper stage). This article examines some of the different possible outcomes of implementation (Fig. 1) that need to be considered while studying plan implementation. The paper has highlighted how the Parvati Hill project was designed and yet stalled. Modification was initiated, but failed, in survey area number 44, as with the 20 per cent construction proposal for the hill slopes. However, the 4 per cent construction modification succeeded in the hill slopes area.

The paper has provided some insights into actors, their interests and the outcomes of their strategies. The central government unexpectedly emerged as a significant actor in Pune's planning, and the PMC came across as a heterogeneous actor. Unfortunately, the cases did not provide the opportunity




Fig. 1 Implementation alternatives

to test heterogeneity among the citizens, or in the state government. However, the cases did highlight the power of the state government over the PMC in preparing and implementing Pune's development plan.

Interests were found to overlap in certain cases. For example, in Parvati Hill, because the local councillor owned part of the site, he represented the interests of both landowners and councillors. This combination of interests probably made him more determined to oppose the project. The same could be said about the present-day local councillor, who lives in a shanty town on the site and thus combines the interests of a slum-dweller and a councillor. Where interests coincided, alliances were formed. For example, NGOs and the media joined hands and opposed the modifications together.

The paper indicates that the interplay of actors can lead to unintended consequences. In survey area number 44, neither of the two opposing forces (commercial developers and NGOs) wanted the existing slums to remain on the site. However, this is precisely what happened after the proposed modification stalled and the PMC became reluctant to implement the original proposal.

This study has highlighted the strategies of the actors, their resources and their partners, and has considered the issues that influence their actions. The following section will analyse these in the context of three key actors: commercial developers, NGOs and the PMC. Only those issues within the analytical framework that have most greatly influenced the performance of these actors will be discussed. Other issues contained in the framework and their influence upon the actors have already been highlighted and summarised in Table 1.

COMMERCIAL LOCAL DEVELOPERS

In all three cases, local commercial developers had big stakes in the proposals, and had resources with which to influence the implementation process at their command. The stakes were particularly high in survey area number 44, where the developer who was interested in constructing residential apartments on the site also owned it. In both survey area number 44 and in the hills, there were indications that the developers had influenced the PMC and the state government. In the case of survey area number 44, the developer succeeded in getting a resolution passed on the floor of the PMC, and the state government (the sanctioning authority) was known to be sympathetic to the developer. In the case of the hills, the resolution to permit 4 per cent construction had been passed, and the state government had gone ahead with its attempt to allow 20 per cent construction.

The developers' influence was most probably felt through both formal and informal networks. For instance, commercial developers in Pune have two organisations that inform the state government and the PMC about developers' views on development issues. Bureaucrats and politicians are invited to speak to these organisations on various occasions, and the organisations also send representations to them. Apart from these formal structures, informal networks consisting of friends and family ties are probably also utilised. Pune has a couple of clubs that are frequented by those in power and those who can afford them. As

mentioned by the convenor of an NGO, such clubs offer an excellent opportunity for nurturing informal networks.

Survey area number 44 also provides an example of the symbiotic relationship between the developer and the councillors, and its implications for plan implementation. It may be recalled that the BJP decided to vote for the de-reservation as a reward for the assistance rendered by the developer in the past.

Surprisingly, in spite of all their efforts and initial successes, the developers did not ultimately succeed in reaching their goals in survey area number 44 or in the hills (at least as far as the 20 per cent proposal was concerned). This was partly because of the implications of their plans for the citizens of Pune. While the original proposals offered collective benefits to the citizens, the modifications desired by the developers would have brought financial gains to developers and landlords at the cost of these benefits. The developers' lack of success was also due to the intervention of the NGOs.

NGOs

If NGOs and the media had not opposed the modifications proposed for survey area number 44 and the hills, they would probably have been passed. Thus, while developers were found to influence the implementation process, NGOs and the media also represent powerful forces in plan implementation or modification.

The mobilisation efforts of the NGOs were facilitated by several factors, including the nature of their membership, the strategies that they employed, their experience of working on similar issues in the past, and the fact that they were trying to secure collective benefits for the citizens. Their staff included eminent personalities from different walks of life—retired senior bureaucrats, academics, lawyers, artists and nature and wildlife experts. They also had technical expertise in planning; the Express Citizens' Forum included retired planners who had been involved in preparing Pune's original plan. This gave credibility to the views of the NGOs.

In discussing ways of making the lobbying strategies of NGOs more effective, Clark (1992, 192–93) suggests that organisations need to form coalitions with other sections of the population such as the academic community, trade unions and religious groups. This would not only help the organisations by pooling relevant information from diverse fields; it would also enable networking with those who have access to powerful figures. The NGOs involved in the implementation of Pune's plan appear to have been following Clark's strategy by including personalities from diverse fields within their membership.⁸

In addition to mobilising the citizens, two NGO strategies proved effective in stopping the modifications: mobilising the central government (survey area number 44), and forming alliances with the media. As mentioned earlier,

8 There is no indication that the membership of the NGOs active in survey area number 44 and the hills included representatives from the poor, and this might have influenced their stand in the two cases.

planning in Pune is beyond the formal jurisdiction of the centre. In spite of this, the NGOs lobbied several ministries which not only agreed in principle to intervene but also took prompt action. This convinced the state government to withdraw its proposed modification. This highlights the powers enjoyed by the centre in the Indian political system. NGO alliances with the Express Citizens' Forum strengthened the movement and made sure that its activities were amply covered in the *Indian Express*. It is uncommon for newspapers persistently to cover a particular news item for a long time, but that was possible here due to the close association of the Express Citizens' Forum with these two cases. This, in turn, helped the NGOs to reach the public on a regular basis.

Moreover, the NGOs had experience of working on similar issues in Pune before getting involved in survey area number 44 and the hills. Several of the strategies that they employed in the cases had already been tested. However, the intervention of the NGOs in both cases was confined to blocking the modifications. NGO reluctance to get involved in the implementation of the original plan proposal, on which the PMC had been silent for years, may be largely explained by the long-term nature of the proposal and the difficulties of mobilising citizen support on this issue. Implementing the original proposal would involve acquiring sites from landowners, clearing slums and developing the sites as specified in the plan. This would take a long time, and, for reasons discussed earlier, it would be difficult for the NGOs to sustain public interest over such a long period. This is not to say that blocking proposal modifications is necessarily a quick process: it may take time, as it did in survey area number 44. However, stopping the PMC from modifying the proposals might have appeared to the NGOs to be less time-consuming than pressurising the PMC to implement proposals that had remained unimplemented for several years.

THE PMC

Collective benefits and the long-term nature of the proposals also influenced the PMC's performance regarding plan implementation. In Parvati Hill, the plan proposal offered a cleaner environment by removing the slums from the site. Moreover, the removal of the slums was expected to prevent the pollution of the canal. These collective benefits enabled the PMC to mobilise the support of the citizens and the media for the project, which in turn facilitated its implementation. However, the project faced strong resistance from some Parvati Hill residents, which eventually led to its failure. This resistance can be explained by the minimal involvement of the residents in the project's design. The project did not offer any incentives or compensation to Parvati Hill residents. This was strongly disapproved of by the residents who opposed the project.

The reluctance of the PMC to implement the original proposals in survey area number 44 and the hill slopes can be explained by the long-term nature of the plan proposal. Implementing the original plan would have required the PMC to acquire these sites, and it expected strong opposition from the landowners and slum-dwellers. The landowners could be expected to go to the court, thus ensuring that the process would take years. After acquiring the sites, the PMC would have had to develop them for the purpose specified in the plan (a park and

a green belt respectively), and would have had to prevent any other use of these sites in the future.

This responsibility is continuous, and the PMC was not keen on such a long-term obligation. While a single municipal leadership ranges between three to five years, the span of the plan is 20 years. Due to the mismatch between these time scales, the councillors are not accountable to the electorate for plan implementation, and therefore implementation does not bring them any political rewards.

Moreover, the implementation of the plan is just one of the PMC's many functions, most of which present immediate challenges for which the municipal body is accountable to the electorate. For example, the PMC is responsible for providing water to areas within its jurisdiction. If there is a water shortage in a particular constituency, it is likely that the local councillor will take up the matter in the PMC and demand an explanation from the relevant municipal officer, in response to the agitation of the residents. The PMC therefore tends to attend to such matters rather than implement a development plan that has a span of 20 years. When the PMC pays attention to the plan at all, it is most likely to be looking at issues that relate to reservations. Those affected by reservations tend to lobby the PMC to de-reserve the sites; if this lobbying is successful, the PMC then initiates de-reservation proceedings. In spite of its apathy towards the plan, the PMC was enthusiastic about the modifications in this study because they relieved it of its task of implementing the original proposal, and the outcome of the modification procedures was expected to appear in the short term. In both survey area number 44 and the hills, the modifications allowed for construction on the reserved sites. Given the high demand for land and the shortage of accommodation, residential construction was expected to appear rapidly on these sites.

Parvati Hill also demonstrated the complexity of the councillors' behaviour due to their varied interests. One of the councillors was not only the local councillor for Parvati Hill and its neighbourhood, but was also the owner of a part of the Hill. While he supported the project at the party level, on the personal level he opposed it because he would lose from it. Survey area number 44 illustrates the difficulty of perceiving the councillors as a homogeneous group. While most of them voted in favour of the modification, some condemned it strongly and accused their colleagues of accepting bribes from the developer.

Conclusion

This paper explored the dynamics of implementing Pune's current development plan, focusing on the political processes involved. It identified the key actors, and analysed the impact of their interplay on the plan's implementation. An analytical framework was developed to help towards this end. This framework may be used to analyse plan implementation in other Indian cities, and probably in other countries.

The implementation of Pune's development plan was found to be influenced significantly by benefit types, particularly collective benefits. These influenced

the performance of the PMC, the response and efficacy of NGOs and the media, and the efforts of the developers. However, the collective benefits were conditioned by the range of the proposals. In spite of the collective benefits offered by the original proposals, the PMC was reluctant to implement them due to their long-term nature, which caused a mismatch with the time-span of the municipal leadership. The time range of the proposals also affected the intervention of NGOs.

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